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
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TRAINED CITIZEN SOLDIER

A SOLUTION OF
GENERAL UPTON'S PROBLEM

BY

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Gold Medalist Military Service Institution

UNIV. OF
CALIFORNIA

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UPTON'S PROBLEM

"The Causes of the weakness are as follows:

First. The employment of militia and undisciplined troops commanded by generals and officers utterly ignorant of the military art.

Second. Short enlistments from three months to three years, instead of for or during the war.

Third. Reliance upon voluntary enlistments, instead of voluntary enlistments coupled with conscription.

Fourth. The intrusion of the States in military affairs and the consequent waging of all our wars on the theory that we are a confederacy instead of a nation.

Fifth. Confusing volunteers with militia and surrendering to the States the right to commission officers of volunteers the same as officers of militia.

Sixth. The bounty—a national consequence of voluntary enlistments.

Seventh. The failure to appreciate military education, and to distribute trained officers as battalion, regimental, and higher commanders in our volunteer armies.

Eighth. The want of territorial recruitment and regimental depots.

Ninth. The want of postgraduate schools to educate our officers in strategy and the higher principles of the art of war.

Tenth. The assumption of command by the Secretary of War.

The main features of the proposed system are as follows:

First. In time of peace and war the military forces of the country to consist of—

The Regular Army,
The National Volunteers, and
The Militia.

The Regular Army in time of peace to be organized on the expansive principle and in proportion to the population, not to exceed one thousand in one million.

The National Volunteers to be officered and supported by the Government, to be organized on the expansive principle and to consist in time of peace of one battalion of two hundred men to each Congressional District.

The Militia to be supported exclusively by the States and as a last resort to be used only as intended by the Constitution, namely, to execute the laws, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions."

—From "THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES," by Major General Emory Upton. Introduction, pages xiii and xiv.

General Upton's book was written in 1880. Since that time some advancement has been made in the art of war. The relations of the United States to other countries have also undergone some vital changes since 1880. The solution herein proposed takes these changes into account, and eliminates to a degree the political problems that would follow from adoption of Congressional Districts as a basis of organization. This solution is published because of conviction that its publication is a civic duty incumbent upon the author as a return to his Country for education at West Point, and further education at Fort Leavenworth.

JOHN H. PARKER.

TRAINED CITIZEN SOLDIERY: A MILITARY SYSTEM FOR THE UNITED STATES

CHAPTER I.

FAILURE OF OUR PRESENT SYSTEM.

Peace Cost In round numbers the cost of our army, on our present scale of pay, is about \$1,000 per man, per year. This is in time of peace, with every expenditure reduced to the minimum. The appropriations run about a million dollars for every thousand soldiers, whether privates in the ranks, or brigadier generals on the retired list. The lowest estimates for a "first line" army to meet the first shock of war with a civilized enemy, is half a million men. This force would at once call for a half a billion dollars per year, merely on a peace basis. It would call at once for one-half of the total revenues of the government.

War Cost But the peace cost of this force is no basis on which to estimate its cost in time of war. Then the whole power of an equal or superior enemy would be actively engaged in trying to destroy this military machine. Horses, clothing, guns, cannon, aeroplanes, artillery projectiles, the most expensive material, all of which is most carefully husbanded in time of peace, would be expended like water in time of war. Cavalry horses

2 *Trained Citizen soldiery*

may cost about \$150 each. In time of peace a horse is normally good for about ten years of service. In time of war the destruction of horses is simply frightful. In war time they are much more expensive than in time of peace. The projectile and charge of a three-inch gun may cost twenty dollars. In time of peace their expenditure is limited to target practice, but in a battle the only limit is the number necessary to win, if enough can be procured for that purpose. The same principle applies in all directions. If it costs three dollars per man per day to maintain the army in time of peace it would be conservative to estimate three or four times that cost in time of war. Ten dollars per man per day would be a conservative estimate for the war cost of the same force.

An Impossible Condition No country in the world ever tried to finance a war on a basis of \$3 per man per day, nor anything like it. No country could possibly finance a war on such a basis, not to speak of ten dollars per man per day. In our country the military system is financed on the theory of hiring military service in open competition with other bidders for labor. It is about the same rotten condition that put the throne of the Caesars on the auction block of the Praetorian Guards. Any National Defense founded upon that idea, bought service, is bound to fail. If a country is not worth fighting for, and if its citizens are not willing to

fight for it, without a thought of profit, it ought to become a minor and subject country, and will do so. No country ever yet maintained itself for any great length of time by hired, or mercenary military service.

The Correct Theory The truth is, that every man owes to his country her defense, exactly as he owes to his mother the duty of protection and defense. He is under both moral and legal obligation to do his fair share of that military service, which is her ultimate defense whenever his country needs his services for that purpose. If she compensates him at all for his military service, his proper share of it, as long as other men do their equal share, such compensation is an act of grace.

Military Shirking But where part of the citizens of a country shirk their military duty, leaving it all to be done by a few, then those who do it are equitably entitled to reimbursement of their losses incident thereto, and to pay for their time, for so much military duty as they perform in excess of what would be their proper share if all citizens did their just share of military duty.

The Ultimate Duty of Citizenship When a nation comes to the death grapple of the Liége or the Marne, fine spun theories and wire drawn exemptions of peace time fail. Mother Patria then expects and must compel every man to do his military duty, his due and proper

share of the National Defense. She has an equal right to expect and to require him to make adequate personal preparation in time of peace to perform that duty efficiently when the occasion arrives. Without suitable personal preparation the citizen cannot be, nor become an efficient soldier, no matter how willing he may be, nor how brave he may be. Men ignorant of their duties, and of how to care for themselves in campaign, are a source of weakness, not of strength in times of emergency in war.

Effect of An army, in peace or in war, fi-
Applying the nanced on the theory that the citi-
Correct Theory zen owes a military duty to the
country, is a very different finan-
cial proposition from one on a basis of industrial
competition. Our country can finance the biggest
army, and the biggest navy in the world, on the
theory that National Defense is a patriotic obliga-
tion, that every citizen owes as a matter of duty
his personal military service to the country, and
with that duty, as a part of it, the equal duty of
personal preparation in time of peace, to perform
his military duty in time of war efficiently. It can-
not finance even a "first line" for a modern war on
the basis of industrial competition, without imme-
diately facing a bond issue, heavy taxation, and ul-
timate bankruptcy. It has been twice brought to
bankruptcy by that system, fortunately at times

when financial disaster did not entail military disaster; but in modern war bankruptcy means immediate military disaster, because the material for war is now so much more expensive than formerly, and successful war cannot be carried on without this expensive material. We can finance anything that can be humanly done, if we go about it right; but it is not within human power to do the impossible. It is not humanly possible to conduct modern war on a mercenary basis. We must return to the true basis that every citizen owes personal military service to his country, just as he owes the duty of defense and protection to the mother who bore him. Return to that theory, carries with it at once a solution of all our problems of National Defense, whether financial or material or military.

*Precedents for
Obligatory Military
Service*

Universal military service was the original doctrine in our country. The militia laws of 1795-6, provided that every able-bodied male citizen between 18 and 45 years of age should be enrolled in the militia, and should receive annually a suitable period of military training. These laws went further; it was provided that every citizen should furnish his own arms and equipment. These were prescribed by the law. The period of training was not long, but the principle of obligatory service was thus asserted, by the very founders of our government, the very men who

framed our present Constitution, and the period of training was ample for the necessities of that time. All men were experienced in the principal duties of a soldier in those days; shooting, walking, riding on horses, the care of animals, and life in the open, were the daily routine of the citizen of that time. The laws of that time prescribed an adequate course of military training for the needs of that time, considering the nature of the material and personnel then available. No doubt, if additional training had been necessary it would have been required. The routine life of the American has changed since then. Hunters, pioneers, woodsmen, men used to care for themselves in the life of the open, are no longer available in adequate numbers for the National Defense. These things, learned at that time by daily experience, must now be taught. Similarly, equipment has changed. It is no longer practicable to require each citizen to furnish his own arms, because military weapons are not common, are not accessible to the average citizen. They are more expensive. They have been standardized, and the use of the standardized type is necessary in modern war.

But the principle is the same. The government then required every man to be enrolled, and to be adequately trained for the military service. We must return to this theory, whether or not we actually utilize all citizens. Once we return to the

theory and practice of the Founders of the Republic we can finance the National Defense, and due preparation therefor, without even inconvenience to our industries; even with positive benefit to them.

*Results of the
Present System*

We must return to that theory unless we court National humiliation. We are already humiliated as a nation. American commerce is unsafe upon the high seas. American industries are being assailed insidiously even at home. American lives are not protected on sea or land by our flag. American Citizens traveling on legitimate business or pleasure, or engaged in legitimate business in other countries that was initiated, as in Mexico, with full consent of the country of its location, have been plundered, outraged by wanton lust, and murdered by cruel violence. Our present system not only does not protect them, but renders it impossible for the government to protect them. Even our soldiers, engaged in peaceable protection of our own citizens within our own territory, have been shot down by lawless bandits, under the eyes of their own officers, who were restrained by orders from protecting them, because our country is not prepared even to chastise a lawless bandit, with a corporal's guard of following.

A nation that cannot, or dare not, command the respect of its neighbors for its innocent citizens,

residing or traveling abroad on legitimate business or pleasure, that cannot, or dare not, resent the assassination of its own soldiers, who are operating under lawful orders, will soon cease to command the loyalty or respect of its citizens at home as well as of its enemies.

It is thereby doubly and justly humiliated, both at home and abroad.

CHAPTER II.

A NEW SYSTEM.

*Specific Faults
of our
Present System*

Our present system has bankrupted the country twice, and would do so again in a single year of modern war. Its faults are:

1. Irresponsible expenditures by 48 different states in time of war, to be eventually paid by the Federal Government.

This one fault is suicidal. It is the worst fault, and an ineradicable fault, of the militia system. That system must therefore be abandoned, except for its constitutional purposes. All attempts to "federalize" the militia must fail, because of this fault, which is inherent in the militia system.

2. Dual control of military forces. War cannot be made with divided control. The militia and "State Volunteer" system carries dual control, partly by state authority and partly by federal authority, by virtue of the limited constitutional authority under which such forces are organized. They are raised and officered by the states, and operated partly under state and partly under federal authority. They can be used only for three specific purposes mentioned in the Constitution. Such a force can hardly be classed as a military force at all in the proper sense of that expression. Such a force

may have uses; but such uses will not be found on battlefields like those on which the fate of France, Belgium and England are now being decided.

3. An impossibly high rate of pay and allowance for any war force. This has grown up under a system of volunteer service, in which men have to be secured in competition with the industrial activities of the nation.

The officer or man who permanently gives up civil occupations is fairly entitled to such compensation as will enable him to live decently. In all my acquaintance in the army, extending over a period of nearly 30 years, I know of only one officer who has saved any considerable sum of money.

Pay of

Regulars

The pay of these officers and men is not too high for the service they render, in consideration of what they have given up to render that service. If anything it is too little to enable them to live as they are required to live and to also make any sort of provision for the future. The mistake is in fixing the pay and allowances of a war force, a temporary force, on the same basis. It is a mistake to say that the man who renders a temporary service is rendering the same service as the one permanently on the job, even though the temporary man may seem at any moment to be performing the same duty as the permanent man.

The Military Shirk Both in peace and in war, every man owes military service to his country.

He owes his proper share of that duty, which would be the amount of military duty one man would do if all were doing their proper share. Those in the United States who do not wish to perform this duty have been permitted for many years to shirk its performance, and the government has hired a few to do what all should have done. The military shirk paid what taxes he could not evade, and that has been his share. The few have paid their equal share of the taxes, and have performed their own military duty, and have also performed the share that was due from all those who have avoided military duty, who have not cared to volunteer for the military training which, alone, can fit any man to do his military duty efficiently.

In time of war, it is the nation's right, its only means of self preservation, to compel the peacetime shirk to perform his military duty in person. The shirk does not thereby earn one cent of pay, nor a stiver of allowances; he is merely paying in this way a solemn, patriotic obligation which he owes to his country. Whatever pay or allowances he receives, come from the bounty and generosity of his country, not as a matter of right or wages.

Furthermore, since the progress of the art of war necessitates much preparatory training that cannot be given after war is imminent, in order that this

military duty may be efficiently performed the country has an equal right to require that every citizen take this necessary preparatory training in time of peace, and the nation incurs no obligation by such training to pay that citizen a cent. The nation merely collects what is due to it. The personal performance of a military obligation, equally incumbent upon all is required as an indispensable means of National Self Defense. Thus far, no obligation to pay anybody a cent has been incurred by the nation.

But for its permanent corps of military instructors, who not only perform all their personal military duty, but also give up all other vocations and dedicate themselves solely to this, adequate pay is due. They earn it.

When the problem of financing the National Defense, is approached from this basis, it is capable of solution, and from no other. Germany, France, Argentina and Switzerland, have solved it on this basis. Three of these countries are republics; so it is idle to say that there is any difficulty inherent in a republican form of government.

Legislative Authority In the United States, the power to provide for the National Defense is vested in the Congress, by the words "Congress shall have power to levy and maintain armies." This power is limited by the provision that no appropriation for this purpose shall run longer than

two years, the legislative life of the representatives who initiate the expense.

The power is ample. It is practically unlimited, or limited only by the necessities of the case and the will of the people. In the beginning of our present form of government, it was exerted by the Congress under the militia clause of the Constitution, but in every crisis, where the peril to the nation has justified it Congress has exercised the power to go direct to the people, without the intervention of the several states, under the more general authority above quoted. Thus in 1863, after the "State Volunteers" and militia systems broke down, draft laws were enacted; and in 1899, "Federal Volunteers" were authorized to meet the emergency in the Philippine Islands.

The power of Congress to enact effective laws on this subject is unquestioned. A crisis has arrived in our national life, when it is absolutely necessary that this power be exercised effectively, and at once. Failure to do so, will insure worse national humiliation than our country has yet suffered, just as soon as the victor of the present clash in Europe shall emerge ready and eager to reimburse its losses at the expense of our rich and defenseless country. Who can doubt that the powers which have plunged half the world into war's red ruin, will be as ready to pillage our rich cities as they have been to disregard all the solemn treaties which were negotiated

to prevent just what is now happening in Europe? Our only safety as a nation lies in timely preparation, not for aggression, but for self defense, and the time to make that preparation is all too short if the very next Congress were to enact the necessary laws in the first week of its session.

This is no time for "pork barrel" appropriations, nor for "political trading" for partisan advantage. The public man who advocates the unnecessary expenditure of a dollar of public funds, the appointment of a single incompetent officer as a trade for his support of the bill, the delay of a single day, is a traitor worse than Benedict Arnold. History will pillory every such politician for public execration; but it will glorify every statesman who helps at this crisis, while there is yet time enough to save the nation, to initiate the only system that can possibly be effective.

*Plans that Will
Not Work* I have studied with much care the plans of the General Staff, as published in 1912, and have found much therein of great assistance in developing a satisfactory plan. Much of the reasoning in that pamphlet is sound; many of the deductions are correct; but the plan does not work out on an adequate scale, nor go sufficiently into detail, to be workable as it stands.

I have studied the newspaper accounts of the Continental Army, to be proposed to the next Con-

gress, and have seen its two vital defects, either of which will prevent it from accomplishing the desired result as far as National Defense is concerned. These two defects are:

1. It depends entirely upon voluntary enrollment for the Continental Army, and does not offer any adequate inducement for such enrollment. A plan that does not insure the necessary enrollment is bound to fail.

2. It proposes to run the war establishment upon the same basis of pay and allowances that has been established for the small regular army in time of peace, as a measure of necessity in order to secure voluntary enlistments in competition with the industries of the country. Such a scale of expenses would bankrupt the country in six months, and the national defense would fail, just as surely through bankruptcy as it would through defeat in the field.

Other serious defects need not be mentioned, and there are many of them. As a political measure for the purpose of capturing votes in the next election, it has many elements of strength; but with two capital defects, either of which would cause the plan to break down utterly in case of war, there is no need for further comment.

*The Fundamental
Condition: Financial
Practicability*

The very fundamental condition of any plan that will promise success is to so arrange the financial side of it as to make the burden of National Defense in war

with a civilized power supportable. It would not be supportable under the present system, nor under the proposed "Continental Army." Successful defense must safeguard the nation from financial exhaustion; for that would bring defeat just as surely as failure in battle. No system based on competition with industrial activities to secure men can be successful. Any such system must attract men by pay, and bounties, and allowances. Such expense will be absolutely ruinous in modern war; it was ruinous in the Revolutionary War, and it brought national bankruptcy in the Civil War. It remains to indicate a system in accord with American Institutions, that will not do this; one that can be supported by the minister, the peace advocate, the mother, the teacher, as well as by the military man; one that cannot be possibly used for an aggressive war, but that will insure the very strongest possible development of our resources in the very shortest time, at the very least expense, if we should ever be compelled to fight a defensive war against wanton aggression by a predatory power.

CLASSIFICATION: Men called to the military service will necessarily be of two classes:

1. Permanent personnel, the few required for permanent organization; *a professional nucleus.*
2. Transient personnel, the many required in emergencies, when the very life of the nation is at stake.

The permanent personnel, will give up all civil opportunities and their life career will be military. They will perform more than their normal share of military duty, and sacrifice more than their normal share of comfort, prosperity and liberty of action, during the whole of their active life. Their compensation will have to be fixed high enough in money and in other military inducements to attract to this profession competent men. The military profession now embraces the technic of all other professions in order to attain reasonable proficiency. More than in any other art, the Master of the Military Art, must be master of all arts; for in his profession he will have occasion to use all of them. For the few commissioned officers of this small permanent personnel, we need men of first-rate ability, men of broad mind, of large and practical ideas, who know how to do anything.

On the other hand, we do occasionally get men of first-rate ability, the peers of Edison, Ford, Deering, John Hays Hammond; but we get very few of them because the inducements offered, will not hold such men. It is not the pay, but the lack of opportunity to rise in the profession, according to their work and their merits, that prevents such men from accepting a military career. Where rank is not reached by longevity in the army, it is reached by sheer favor in most cases. The mere fact

that we are still groping in the dark for a suitable military system for our country attests the point.

The necessary inducements must be something more than mere pay; they must include some sort of a system, by which men of first-rate ability will have assurance of an opportunity to get forward in the military profession to positions commensurate with their ability and work. The issue involved is bigger than the interests of any man, or class of men; it is one that is vital to the nation, because men of first-rate ability are needed in the military service, both in peace and in war, and needed as directors; more needed, perhaps, in peace than in time of war. Opportunity to work and to get forward is what such men demand. They will not stay in a profession that denies them this opportunity. Therefore, "seniority promotion" will have to be modified enough, in some way, to permit such men to get forward into the directive positions.

The army pay is ample, as it now is, without any increase, and is not excessive for the small permanent personnel. The necessary modification of the system of promotion will be proposed later in this study.

Transient Personnel The transient personnel assumes the character of a soldier for only temporary service; long enough, in time of peace to learn the essential elements of the military art necessary for them to know, and in time of war, long enough to restore peace. They do not give up

the opportunity of civil life; on the contrary, their military service is frequently of aid to them in civil life through the associations formed by them in their military service. They render to their country only their minimum military obligation. They are not by that service entitled to receive a cent of pay. They are only discharging an obligation due from them to the nation, in return for all the incalculable benefits conferred upon them, by the free and civilized institutions to which they were born. They do this in order to preserve those institutions, and those benefits for themselves and their posterity. So long as the burden of personal military service is shared equally by all citizens, no compensation is due to any of them for it. National safety cannot be assured on any other basis; and, moreover, this basis is right and just to all.

Voluntary Service In our country, however, the number of citizens available for military service is so much greater than the number required for it, and our traditions in favor of voluntary service are so strong, that since some sort of system for the selection of the men for military service is necessary, a system is preferable by which an adequate number of voluntary applicants can be secured, thereby exempting the great mass of our citizenship from active military service, except in great emergencies. A system of voluntary military service is preferable for us, provided it be

within the financial reach of the country, and gives adequate insurance against the predatory tendencies of possible enemies. A system that will facilitate such voluntary service, while still reserving the right and asserting the authority of the nation to enforce obligatory military service when necessary, is preferable to conscription, and the country can well afford to incur a reasonable expense to institute such a system.

*Size of Military
Insurance Policy*

The best judgment of our ablest military men agrees that we must make available for immediate action, at all times a trained force of about 500,000 men. This force must be trained, equipped, organized in time of peace, and ready for instant action; but need not necessarily be separated from industrial activity until the occasion for its use arrives, if any way can be found for its training and organization consistent with normal industrial activity of its members. The best military men we have are agreed that such a force would be an adequate insurance against war; would probably prevent war from ever being made upon our country, by any other country or group of countries.

The Permanent Personnel can be a part of this force, and it can be utilized in training the remainder of this force. Sound considerations of economy require that the permanent personnel should be used in both these ways, as far as practicable. The permanent personnel would thus have two functions.

1. Ordinary military service in time of peace; a sort of police duty.

2. The work of a great Training School for Minute Men, in which the rest of our emergency forces shall be shaped up and organized for instant action in peace time.

The regular army has never been used as such a training school in the past. The training school for war, in all our past wars, has been the school of War, the most expensive possible school for such training. Always the most expensive school of training, under modern conditions it is also the least efficient, and is sure to lead to disaster. Trained troops can be met successfully by none but troops equally well trained, and the great peril before our country at present is that it will be overwhelmed by the European Victor, with tremendous numbers of the best trained veterans of the greatest war in history. So many grievances against our country are being nursed by all the contestants, and so rich is the prize that awaits the aggression of the victor, that there can be no doubt of the pretext nor of the peril. It is useless to discuss the subject with anyone who cannot see, or will not admit these facts. No appeal can be made to such intelligence. The appeal to save our country by timely military preparation, if there yet be time, is to those who can see the peril, and are willing to do what is possible to avoid its effects.

CHAPTER III.

PRELIMINARY DATA FOR ESTIMATES OF COST.

How to approach an estimate In order to make any intelligent estimate of the cost of adequate preparation two things must be determined;
1. Size and cost of Permanent Personnel.

2. Size and cost of War Force thought necessary.

It would be well for purpose of comparison to have also an idea of the present cost of our existing system of unpreparedness. The cost of the regular army, proper, is about one hundred millions per year. To this must be added the pension list of the Civil War, a direct tax upon unpreparedness, of about a hundred and forty millions per year. The total cost of the present system, therefore, is very nearly a quarter of a billion dollars per year.

The pension list of the Civil War is now declining, and its annual decrease might be diverted to military preparation for the future without in any way increasing the military burdens of the country. No better monument to the veterans who saved the nation could be made than to erect a bulwark of safety to protect the future of that nation. In ten years from now, in all probability, the decrease in their pension roll will amount to a hundred millions

per year. Hence any plan that would give us an adequate military system at a cost of less than a hundred millions per year can be put through without entailing any increase whatever in military expenses.

I would not decrease the allowances made to the men of 1865 by a dollar. All honor to them. The most distinguished chapter in American History is that which records the substantial generosity extended to them in their time of need by the nation they saved from disunion. But I would look to the future and as their account is diminished by the toll of time I would divert the saving thus made into the creation of a permanent insurance of the National Safety, a monument in their honor and to their memory, in the form of a system of National Defense that shall forever safeguard what they fought for.

*Divisions of the
Permanent
Personnel*

The size of the Permanent Personnel depends upon its uses.

These are three:

1. A Training School for National Defense.

2. An Expeditionary Force.

3. An Oversea Force.

These three elements of the permanent military establishment are worthy of further discussion.

Divisions of the Training School

Such a Training School should cover every necessary element of National Defense on the American continent. It would necessarily be divided into groups which would specialize upon appropriate subjects, coast defense, mobile artillery, machine gun development and service, aero service, infantry, cavalry, signal service, sanitation, and so on, would all be provided for, each in its due proportion. We have already nuclei for nearly all these groups. Each group nucleus would not merely keep abreast of world development in its specialty, but would also be charged with the development, education, training and mobilization of the complete force of that special unit required at any time by the circumstances.

Use of the Component Parts

For example, the infantry group of the training school would each year receive, instruct, equip and organize, the men destined to the infantry service in case of war, and would mobilize these men whenever directed to do so by proper authority. In like manner the coast defense component, the aero component, and each other component of the training school, would receive, instruct, equip, organize, mobilize when so ordered, and demobilize upon expiration of service, the troops destined to service in that specialty.

*Directorate of
Training;
The Generals'
Staff*

Over all these complex operations, both in peace and in war, would be "The Generals' Staff," a corps of technical military experts, whose proper function is to assist commanders in the formulation of orders for and execution of military operations. The organization and duties assigned to our general staff by Secretary Root remain substantially unchanged. They converted this body into an advisory council, split up into committees and subcommittees, devoid of responsibility, functioning in such a manner that no one can be held responsible for mistakes in anything it does. The very nature of military decisions requires individual responsibility. This we have not, and never have had, under the present organization, which is more noted for an elaborate system of "passing the buck" than for any other peculiarity.

Possibly the system adopted for the organization of what we now call "The General Staff" was a reflex of the routine method of passing responsibility that has been in vogue so long in the army; possibly it was due to the fact that the whole subject was new; as new to the officers of our service as it was to Secretary Root. The Secretary took counsel with the best available officers, notably with General W. H. Carter, and no doubt he did the best that could be done at that time; but the responsibility

was his, and the defects of organization are justly chargeable to him as well. No one will dispute that a high level of excellence has been maintained in the personnel of that body, but many may doubt whether or not the results of their work have justified its existence as such a body. We are not perceptibly nearer to a satisfactory state of National Defense as a result of their efforts, but as a result of a great public awakening of interest in the subject. This has been due primarily to an unselfish campaign for publicity as to the needs of the nation by certain army officers, who have paid the expenses of that campaign out of their own pockets, and secondarily to the events of the last year in other countries by which Americans have been compelled to take stock of their military resources.

Correct its Be that as it may, in the sound organization of our military resources
Defects that should now be made, all known defects should be corrected. Experience has developed them; observation of the working of "The Generals' Staff" in other countries has furnished a better conception of its correct organization and use; advantage should be taken of these elements of progress. It is properly a body of tactical experts, and should never be treated as anything else. Let us make a plan that will insure competent commanders, with picked "Generals' Staffs," and

will fix responsibility beyond the power of any man to evade it.

The General Conception Now, with a conception first of the total force that should be prepared in time of peace for instant mobilization (500,000), and second of the part to be played by the Permanent Personnel in this work under the supervision of the "Generals' Staff," one element of the problem is outlined and we may consider other phases of it.

Analogy of a Contractor A contractor estimating for the labor, materials, time and expense required on any job, would consider what he has to do, the available materials, and what personnel he can command, in order to reach an estimate of the time and the expense. We who have been educated for that purpose by the Government, who have been especially trained for the military service of the country, and who have had long experience in military work, may be regarded as the expert estimators and overseers who are employed on this job by the Congress, as Contractor for the National Defense for the American People. Our work should be to make the necessary estimates, and then to superintend the performance of the contract. As such, we have now estimated for 500,000 men, the trainers to constitute a permanent gang of workmen. This Permanent Personnel will have two other jobs in addition to the training of the

500,000 of which they will form a part. Before we can determine the size of the Permanent Personnel we must consider, therefore, the other two jobs that will be assigned to it, in order to make an intelligent estimate of the size of the permanent gang of workmen. That is exactly the way any contractor would approach a job. He would first determine the size of his permanent gang, then how many temporary employees he would need in the execution of his contract. With this data he could figure out the size of his weekly pay roll.

*The Three
Jobs of the
Permanent
Personnel*

Training of both permanent and transient personnel, and arrangements for the necessary supplies for military operations for the whole force on a war basis, is the first of the tasks for the permanent personnel. Its second task is the defense of those oversea possessions which, unless we have a Navy big enough to command both the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, cannot be reinforced after war becomes imminent. Their defense must therefore be provided for in time of peace, and by the permanent personnel, since it will be impossible to count on utilizing the transient personnel for that purpose. The third task is to create and to maintain an expeditionary force of adequate size for necessary uses. The relief of the Legation in Peking, and the Occupation of Vera Cruz, and the Texas Division which has been under field orders now four years,

illustrate both the necessity and the solution of this part of the task.

Colonial defense and expeditionary duty are legitimate activities of the army which cannot be performed by transient personnel. In the nature of the case, since military responsibility terminates with discharge from the military service, a temporary personnel is not suitable for employment on work of these classes. The case of Captain Brownell, brought to public notice in 1902 during the investigation of the conduct of the war in the Philippine Islands, illustrates one vital objection to the employment of temporary forces for that class of work; and the refusal of the militia of New York state to cross to Queenstown in support of the attack on that place in 1812 illuminates another vital objection. With two vital objections it is not worth while to discuss the use of transient personnel for either of these purposes. These forces must be part of the Permanent Personnel; and in addition it must also comprise whatever number is necessary to act as instructors for the Transient Personnel.

*Estimates for
Permanent
Personnel;
Do we include
the Philippines?*

When our estimate has been prepared on the basis of our present international and domestic obligations, and when such estimate comes before the Congress for its consideration, it will be well within the scope of congressional action to decide

whether, in view of the additional cost, it is worth while to defend that country which, if its representatives are to be believed sincere, is clamoring for the chance to defend itself. It may be well to consider whether or not our country should get rid of an outlying dependency not worth from any standpoint the cost of its defense, and that shows no gratitude or appreciation for the advancement in education, in manufactures, in roads, and in liberty of speech and publication, that have been given to its people under American Sovereignty.

Indeed, it is necessary that the question should be considered whether or not its defense shall be included, in order to make any intelligent estimate of the Permanent Personnel required by our country for its own defense; for the outlying dependency is a source of great weakness if considered from a purely defensive point of view, but can be made an element of great strength in case an "offensive defensive" is contemplated. There are two ways of conducting a defense. One is to sit still, await attack, and let our own country bear the brunt of the war. The other is to "Carry the war into Africa," assail the enemy in his most vulnerable points, and make his own people endure some of the hardships of war. The Philippines can be made an element of great strength in case our country should ever be engaged in war with any Power that has Oriental

Possessions, provided our defense shall include offensive action against such enemy.

It is not merely whether the Philippines are worth to our country the cost of their defense, but also whether or not there exists any constitutional authority in our government, except the treaty making power, by which their defense *can* be neglected. The oath to support the constitution and execute the laws of the United States, which is taken by every member of the army from the President down to the latest recruit, makes no exception of any part of the territory of our country over which the Flag legitimately flies. The surrender of Manila without active defense would be just as disgraceful as was the surrender of Detroit. Public property and American Sovereignty belong to the United States just as much in Manila as they do in Chicago or New York. The very newspapers and peace advocates who advocate the abandonment of the Philippines would be the first to condemn an officer of the army who should follow the example of General Hull in Manila.

No doubt cession of territory to another country by treaty would be just as legitimate as the acquirement of territory from another country by treaty, but this disposition of the Philippine Islands has never been advocated by anybody, nor proposed by any other country. It need not be considered here.

But the question whether the right of secession, finally denied to the states at Appomattox, may be exercised by the Congress of the United States by terminating American Sovereignty over any portion of territory where it has been rightfully established, is a novel one which has never been tested by the Supreme Court nor adjudicated by the Arbitrament of War. This question will have to be adjudicated before it will be possible to erect any part of the territory of the United States into an independent Sovereignty by Act of Congress, and then terminate American Sovereignty over that territory by ceding it to the independent State thus erected. The proposition that while a State may not initiate secession, Congress may do so by the exercise of some sort of extra-constitutional power is a novel one that need not concern us in this discussion. The President, the Officers of the Army, and all the members of Congress are under an oath of office to support and defend the existing constitution and laws of the United States. When the proponents of this new form of secession are face to face with the responsibility of action, as these responsible officers are now, it is probable that they will prefer the legitimate method of seeking an amendment to the constitution of the United States granting specific authority for the proposed action, to any overt act of secession in a new form which might, possibly, subject them to impeach-

ment for treason and to the penalties prescribed for conviction of treason under such impeachment. Secession was found a few years ago to be a serious crime, costing much treasure and many lives. Membership in Congress confers no more right to initiate it than membership in the legislature of South Carolina. Even the members of Congress who were from the South resigned their seats in the Congress of the United States before they assumed part in the attempt at secession from its authority.

The Oath of Office Time is the universal solvent, and will, no doubt, solve the question as to the ultimate disposition of the Philippine Islands; but in the meantime all the officials of the United States, army officers, congressmen, Commander-in-chief, are under oath to support and defend the Constitution and Laws of the United States, and to see that, in the case of the President, these laws be faithfully executed. All the judges of the Supreme Court are bound by the same oath. By this oath, until released from it in a lawful manner, they are bound to support and to defend the Sovereignty of the United States in every square foot of territory in which it exists. The Sovereignty of the United States over the Philippine Islands was acquired by treaty, by purchase and by conquest, the three indefeasible means of acquiring sovereignty, the same means by which the sovereignty of the United States has been established

over all the other territory which it holds; co-extensive, co-equal, and of the same binding force in every part of the jurisdiction of our country, whether at Bladensburg, at Fort Sumpter, in Washington, in Honolulu, or in Manila.

The An assault upon that sovereignty by
Obligation a foreign nation, or a state of insurrection by its own population, would be exactly the same national insult, whether committed at Jolo or at Sandy Hook. The responsible officers of the government, Congress, the President and the army and navy, would be under precisely the same obligation to assert and to maintain that sovereignty in Jolo or Manila as Charleston or in San Francisco (in territory acquired by the same means, by conquest, by purchase and by treaty, though held a few years longer).

Estimate The estimate for the defense
must include of oversea possessions, therefore,
Oversea Defense must include the defense of *all* of them, regardless of ephemeral and pernicious political agitation for a new form of secession; agitation as pernicious as it was in 1860, unless directed toward accomplishment of its object in a lawful manner through due constitutional amendment. Officers of the Army should have no more to do with it than they should have had to do with secession in 1861. This estimate must include the defense of the Philippine Islands, because so

long as American Sovereignty extends to them they must be defended by the United States. No military man would consider the inhabitants capable of defending them against any First-class Power, least of all any officer who took part as the author did in the conquest of the Philippines from 1899 to 1901. The bare idea that the natives, alone, could do anything of the sort is merely ridiculous.

In like manner, these estimates must include the defense of Alaska, of Porto Rico, of Hawaii, of Guam, and of the Panama Canal. None of these dependencies are capable of self defense, and none of them could be sacrificed without loss to the prestige and dignity of the United States, without violation of the oaths of office of the responsible officers of the federal government. The last international developments have brought home to even the most obstinate peace propogandists that the "Scraps of Paper" on which so many Americans have based their hope for permanent world peace are utterly valueless whenever the interest of any predatory power may incline it to aggression. Whether we consider England's plans for using Belgium as a portal to Germany, or the above definition of a treaty, or the double dealing of Belgium as proved by the official publications of both England and Germany and by the publication of its own captured records, it is equally evident that no treaty can be relied upon for National Defense, no Hague Con-

vention will protect our country from rapine and pillage, our citizens from wanton outrage and destruction. Indeed, many of them have already suffered these, not merely at the hands of the belligerent nations of Europe in spite of the official protests and threats of the Washington Government, but also at the hands of irresponsible brigands in Mexico, under the very eyes of military officers of high rank (as at Douglas, Arizona, November 2 to 4, 1915), without reprisal and without protection, for fear of worse consequences if we should try to protect them, because our country is not prepared for self defense. No treaty can protect the weak against the rapacity of the strong. Only the Might of the Eternal can do that, and if that Might was not exercised to protect the Innocent on Calvary what hope is there that it will protect the innocent at Liège, at Louvain, or in New York or in Washington? The Millenium is not yet, nor will be until it is established by the Power of the Almighty. The Filched millions of a foreign "philanthropist" are as powerless to establish it as a Papal Bull to excommunicate science or the mandate of a king to dam back the tides of the ocean.

The permanent establishment of World Peace does not lie within human power to accomplish, and until Divine Providence sees fit to give other Expressions to its Will than our present institutions, the son will owe protection and defense to the feeble-

ness of the mother who bore him, the might of chivalry must still protect the weakness of innocence and virtue, the patriotic citizen must still unsheath the sword of his glorious predecessors of all ages and all countries when his country calls upon him in her hour of need.

In the discharge of this duty it will not be for him to say; "this part I will defend, that part I will refuse to protect"; but it will be his duty, as that of all loyal, true and faithful soldiers, to defend with all his might that station to which his country shall assign him. It will be equally the duty, as it is the sworn obligation, of her statesmen and lawmakers, to defend and protect all parts of the country's territory, *all its citizens*, wherever they may be, without regard to race, creed or condition. These duties have always been discharged by American Soldiers in the past, have always been provided for by American Statesmen in the past. Please God, *our people have not become degenerates*, nor forfeited their birthright. They have the richest heritage on the earth, they have the virility to not only develop and enjoy that heritage, but also to protect and to defend it, and to transmit it unimpaired to red blooded descendants who will follow their example.

And so these oversea possessions of our country, the acquisition of which was hailed as an extension of the American System by Divine Providence, must be defended as long as our Flag flies legiti-

mately over them. And so the proper estimates for their defense must be included, must be made by the few trained officers who are capable of that sort of work, must be provided for by the Congress of the United States as part of its sworn duty, and will be sanctioned by the People of the United States whenever the matter is presented to them as political issue for their decision.

CHAPTER IV.

ESTIMATE FOR PERMANENT PERSONNEL.

Size of Estimate Estimates of this sort have been made from time to time by the best military officers we have. These estimates have been revised by the best ability of the General Staff. The estimates thus made give the best starting point we have for the solution of the problem of National Defense. They call for one mobile Division, with a proper complement of coast defense troops, for the Philippine Islands; one brigade each, with like components of coast defense troops, for Hawaii and for Panama; for a regiment and proper coast defense components in Alaska, for smaller units for other oversea defenses; for an Expeditionary Division always ready for action. This is the part of the Permanent Personnel that must be always on a basis for immediate active service. Summed up, for oversea duty these estimates call for two complete mobile divisions, and for coast defense troops which make an aggregate of about 50,000 men.

War Basis Necessary, for this force This component of the Permanent Personnel, in the opinion of all competent officers, should be organized, maintained and trained, on a war basis as to numbers, equipment and organization, at all times. These troops can expect no help

from the homeland until the seven seas shall have been policed of all enemies. No reinforcements, nor new equipment, nor additional ammunition, nor food can reach them for many months after war begins. In the case of the Philippine Islands there is little room to doubt that insurrection by the Tagalog Tribe (only) will add to their difficulties. The Macabebees, the Igorrotes, the Ifugaos and the Moros will probably remain loyal, but no sane man who knows the Tagalog will trust that race, either individually or collectively. No longer ago than Christmas, 1914, while a bill was pending in Congress with every prospect of being enacted into a law which would have made the Tagalogs virtually masters of the whole Philippine Islands, an attempt was made by members of that tribe to start an insurrection with the avowed purpose of massacring the white people in the islands. Three times in a single night were the troops at Fort William McKinley turned out by the call, "To Arms!" The attempt was unsuccessful, but no one who knows them can doubt that its object meets the approval of the whole Tagalog tribe. So there is no doubt that this particular garrison will have insurrection to contend with from within, as well as foes from without, in the event of war.

Porto Rico dominates the Caribbean, and would be a prize for any enemy. Hawaii dominates the Pacific, and must be an object of attack in time of

war. The coal and gold of Alaska will be as potent a magnet to draw attack as the strategical positions of Porto Rico, Hawaii and the Philippines, and the Panama Canal is bound to bear the brunt of a stubborn attempt to capture this commercial aorta of the world.

The Estimates are Minimum The estimates above made are the irreducible minimum. They cannot be safely revised downward. If revised at all they must be increased. They were made before the thunderbolt of August, 1914, was hurled at civilization; before the lessons of the past year upset all previous notions of the military art.

Since August 1914 the air has become peopled above battlefields with armored aeroplanes armed with machine guns and dropping death dealing darts while they accurately locate ranges with smoke bombs for 42 centimeter, 20 mile, asphyxiating artillery; automobile trucks have raised the rate of march for infantry from 15 miles per day to 120 miles per day, as in Gallieni's flank movement for the Defense of Paris, have borrowed the scythes of Boadicea to smash through wire entanglements, and emulate with their machine guns on land the torpedoes of the submarine in the sea; search lights have made every commander a Joshua who can prolong the daylight at will for the enemy's slaughter; infantry and cavalry are discarding the

rifle, as they formerly did the crossbow, for the more deadly and efficient machine gun. The whole equipment of war has been changed in the last year. These oversea garrisons will have to fight against an enemy now panoplied with destructive armaments of deadly power and will be themselves armed with an equipment as obsolete as the Pliocene Club of Pithecanthropus Erectus until we can arouse the non-military American public to the fact that a new Art of War has sprung, full armed, from the battlefields of Belgium and France during the past year.

No; these estimates for oversea defense cannot be revised downward. Any reconsideration must augment them. Probably they should be greatly increased in this discussion; but there are so many things pressing to be done, the estimates made and to be made will call for as much of an increase as can be wisely made at one time on account of scarcity of competent leadership to install a greater increase at the present time, that we will adopt these estimates as a working basis and go on with the discussion. We cannot do all that is to be done at a single stroke, either in estimate or in action. Let these estimates stand as they are, inadequate as they are.

*Expeditionary
Force*

The second element of the Permanent Personnel is an Expeditionary Force. Our history is full of occasions when it has been necessary to use such

a force. When it is necessary there is little time to organize, and none to train it. An adequate body of troops should, therefore, be estimated for in any sound scheme of National Defense for this purpose.

*Oversea and
Expeditionary
Forces cannot
be combined*

From the very nature of their duties the forces already estimated for as oversea defense will not be available for an Expeditionary Force. They must remain at the place assigned to them, more especially when the storm clouds of international discord lower enough to require the use of an expeditionary force.

The part of the Permanent Personnel to be assigned to the duty of training the citizen soldiery will be obliged to work on a regular schedule if their economical utility be considered. Such schedules will no doubt start with homogeneous classes of recruits, and will proceed through an intensive course of training so as to make these recruits serviceable in the shortest possible time. In this way the smallest possible training force will be required, and its output of trained soldiers, ready for duty wherever they may be sent, will be the maximum output practicable with the plant and equipment. That is the way any contractor or manufacturer would estimate for the use of any plant and equipment, in order to obtain its maximum utility. The principles which govern this problem are the same that govern any other in

which the data are men, materials and time; the requirement, a finished product at the end of the operation.

*Training School
and Expeditionary
Personnel Cannot
be Combined*

This operation of turning out a finished product of well trained soldiers cannot be economically carried on if the manufacturing plant is subject to frequent interruptions, its skilled specialists frequently pulled off their work and assigned to other duties, to be replaced when the plant resumes operations with other overseers or instructors not experienced in the special work of this particular plant, and its classes interrupted in the midst of their course of training.

*Illustration from
College Work*

The case may be illustrated in another way by college work. A class enters college and begins a course of instruction. It is under skilled teachers. If permitted to continue its work without interruption this class will complete its course in a certain time, and its members will then receive their diplomas as proficient in the course of instruction. But if the class is frequently taken off its regular work and put on other work for months at a time; if its teachers are frequently taken away in the midst of their course of instruction and other teachers assigned who are neither familiar with the course nor with the personnel of the classes nor ac-

quainted with the schedules; it is evident that the time required by this class for the completion of its course of training will be greatly extended, its proficiency impaired, and the number of students who will complete the course will be smaller than if it had proceeded without interruption under its original instructors.

Application of Illustration This illustrates exactly what will happen if the attempt be made to use the Expeditionary Force as a training school. A call for the suppression of mob violence in Colorado or Chicago or Pittsburgh; an outrage on the Texas border; a sailor's row at Valparaiso, Relief for a Legation in Peking, any one of a hundred calls such as have come unexpectedly in the past will come in the future, will break up schedules, will take away instructors, will paralyze all efforts at systematic training of the transient personnel. Thus if the Expeditionary force be used for Training School duty the whole system will fail. It will be at all times in a condition of unstable equilibrium.

Another Objection The objects for which an Expeditionary Force will be used, require at all times the highest condition of training and discipline. Like war, the occasion will come unexpectedly. The expedition must start at once to be effective. There is no time for further training or for reorganization. If it were part of the

Training School, it would be necessary to separate the permanent part from the transient part of the personnel, and raise the permanent part to war strength by new assignments. At the same time the training school would be disorganized by this change of personnel.

If we consider taking the whole personnel, training school, both transient and permanent, that is, both instructors and students (for that is what all the transient personnel will be during the first year), we have the old problem of using partially trained forces. The present war in Europe ought to make argument on that subject unnecessary. Untrained forces, or partially trained forces, cannot stand against well trained forces. That is all there is to it. A hastily organized regiment, like the "Rough Riders," containing picked material, commanded by one of the most forceful personalities in the world, *may* acquit itself creditably in a headlong dash, followed by a smashing charge, just as the "Rough Riders" did; but such a force is not well adapted to the gruelling work of guerrilla warfare in the Philippines, or the years of "watchful waiting" along the Rio Grande. The pacification of the Philippines could not be accomplished with such a force. It remained unfinished until regular troops, with abiding, permanent responsibility, could be furnished for that work. If the Expeditionary Force were to be taken temporarily

from the troops assigned to training work for the transient personnel, all these evils would be met with; and if part of the transient personnel were taken with it, then all these evils would be met, and in addition, there would be a suspension of the work of the training school, proper, as long as the emergency might exist. Sometimes these emergencies last for many months, or even years; troops have been on "temporary" duty on the Rio Grande now for four years.

*The Conclusion as
to Expeditionary
Force.*

It may therefore be concluded that there should be an Expeditionary Force, composed of trained troops, with permanent personnel, ready at all times for any service that may be necessary, either in the continental limits of the United States, or in any other place in the world, where American Citizens may need protection for their persons or their interests.

*Size of
Expeditionary
Force*

The size of such a force for the United States depends upon the purposes for which it may be required. The estimate for its size should be based upon the uses made of such forces in the past, and the probable future needs of the country, as based upon our world relations and needs. The amount to be set aside for this use, like that for other purposes, is with the representatives of the people to determine. It is the prerogative

of the Congress, representing the People, to determine finally all such matters.

In the matter of estimates, the smallest one that any military expert will sanction is that unit which contains within itself all the elements of an independent military command. This is determined not by the military experts of our own country, but by those of the whole world. We who make a lifelong profession of Arms, are as powerless to alter this unit as a Member of Congress, for it is determined by the military experience of all armies, in all countries, through all time. The name of the unit varies, but the substance remains the same. That unit is called, at the present time, in our Field Service Regulations, A Division.

In the unanimous opinion of all military experts, the very smallest possible force that will serve our country's needs, for an Expeditionary Force, is one complete division. Until further study of the subject by other officers equally expert, and supplied with later data, shall indicate a change in these figures, they must stand as the irreducible minimum for this purpose. It is not likely that future estimates will revise this estimate downward. The internal needs and external relations of the country are much more likely to increase it, than to diminish it. This calls for about 20,000 men.

The Training School

The third element of the Permanent Personnel, is that necessary for the training of the Transient Personnel. As in other matters of estimates, there must be a just balance between the results required and the means employed.

Separate Solution Necessary

If the training of the transient personnel for National Defense, can be managed as a separate mission, and not complicated by the concurrent solution by the same trainers of other problems, foreign to that subject, it will be greatly simplified. For example, if at a given time and place, there are 2,000 young men, who are willing to be trained for military duty, and if there are available, at the same time enough regular officers and men, to conduct that training, evidently the training of these 2,000 green men can be carried through efficiently and most quickly, by commencing with all of them at the same time, and following a well considered schedule of training without interruption to its completion, under the same management from beginning to end.

But if the training commence with groups of various sizes, at irregular intervals in point of time, if it be conducted by instructors whose tenure of duty is uncertain, and who are changed from one duty to another at frequent intervals, without warning, then if the whole course on instruction is liable

to sudden, unforeseen and unavoidable interruption for irregular periods; under the conditions the 2,000 men will not be as quickly trained, nor as well trained, as in the former case.

Stated another way: the material is so many green men; the job is to impart a certain course of instruction, training and discipline; the means available consist of certain material, equipment, and a certain number of instructors. Manifestly, the most economical utilization of these instructors and of this material, both in time and in expense, will be to place under instruction the maximum number they can efficiently manage, arrange for continuous instruction, and then keep everybody at work on the job on schedule, until the course be completed.

Economy of Energy and Money That is exactly what has never been done in the preparation of the National Defense. It is exactly what must be done in order to economically utilize men, material, money and time. The problem of financing the national defense, depends upon the *economical* expenditure of the funds appropriated for that purpose, and this, in turn, depends upon the *economical utilization* of the Permanent Personnel. We must determine the minimum number possible of permanent personnel to do the work, the most efficient manner in which this minimum number can be used in order to train the required number; and then we can estimate for the

cost. There is no other way in which even an approximation to the cost can be reached; and it is certain that the very first question that will be asked by any Congressman, by any Voter, will be; "How much will your plan cost?" His next question will be; "How much of a force will your plan produce?" The worst fault of all plans thus far proposed is that neither of these questions can be answered by their proponents, because they have not approached the problem in the right way. Like every other problem in the world, there is a correct solution, and all other solutions are not correct.

The Basic Element; In making an estimate of the
the individual; time required to train the
How much time? transient personnel we must
start with the basic unit, the

individual. We can do no better than to accept the consensus of expert military opinion as to the length of time required to train the average individual to a reasonable degree of military efficiency. This is a matter which has been made a business by the Germans, the French, the Swiss and the Italians. With them it is reduced to an exact art. The lowest time they consider adequate is two years.

We, also, have some valuable data on this subject. In the Civil War it was not uncommon to send green regiments to the firing line. The first battle of Bull Run is one example of the results. Later in the war more time was given to preparation.

There was more experienced leadership of the higher units. We do not find a Commanding General performing the duties of a battalion and regimental commander in 1863-65, and we do find troops rather more effectively used than McDowell used them in 1861. But we do not find any really efficient with less than a year of training, unless the training has been in actual campaign, and we find a terrible wastage of men and material, due to lack of proper training all through that war. We had some later experience in 1898, with similar results. We believe that American men can take this training more quickly than any other men in the world, especially if we reach that class which can be reached only by a call upon their patriotism, a class which will not volunteer in time of peace, but which will readily respond when the life of the nation is in peril. We are confident that this class of men can be more quickly trained than any other, but we cannot say to our fellow citizens, that even the best of this class will be able to do the work without *at least one year of training in time of peace.*

The best judgment of the most expert military men in our country agrees that we cannot give adequate training in time of peace, even to the very best class of American material, in less than one year. We can do it a little more quickly in time of war, probably, when every faculty of both officers and men will be keyed up to a higher pitch, but

it will be at very great expense of men and material and money, and at very great risk of initial defeats in the war which may cost the country very dear. It is to avoid the possibility of these defeats, if that be humanly possible, that we insist upon a whole year of time for peace training.

It is not worth while to go into technical details about this. The Banker who employs a skilled architect to estimate for building a mansion would be foolish to quibble with that architect over minor details of the estimate; how many pounds of nails, gallons of paint, feet of lumber, bundles of shingles, would be required. He would employ the best architect he could afford, would consider the estimate as a whole, and would build or not build according to his pleasure, after considering the finished estimate.

He who projects building a railroad, would not quibble with the contractor about how many days' work or how many scrapers would be necessary, for a given section of the road; he would consider the bids and award the contract or not, according to the price and time and ability of the contractor to do the job as required.

Analogy of the Contractor So in this case. Congress, for the Nation, has a job to be done to insure the National Defense. It can award the contract to the skilled bidders, who know how to make the correct estimates, who can deliver the best work in the shortest time, at the lowest ex-

pense; or it can defer the matter until some great public emergency compels the acceptance of much inferior work from less competent hands, at much greater expense, and it will also run the additional risk of failure to deliver at all, by unskilled contractors, or even by the most skillful ones, by reason of lack of time enough to do the job. In this case Congress is acting like an owner of a warehouse full of valuable and inflammable stores, who refuses to take out any fire insurance, or to organize an effective fire department, but depends upon a volunteer "bucket brigade" to be organized *after* the alarm is given. The bucket brigade may put out the fire; it did in 1865, after four years of terrible losses; but the owner of the warehouse will probably lose most of the contents of the building. When the very life of a nation is the issue, such a course of neglect is criminal folly. There is no other right word for it.

Estimate of Time The most reliable estimates of the most expert trained officers in our country agree that one year of time is the minimum necessary for training each man, for his duty as a member of the transient personnel, under the best system we can devise, and under the most favorable conditions for that training. We will accept that estimate as the basis of our calculations.

*Corps of
Instructors*

They also agree that three commissioned officers and about 25 trained soldiers will make the most efficient and effective instructors for the basic unit of one company, and that this unit of instructors can most economically handle about 125 green men; in other words, that if we take a cadre of three commissioned officers and 25 trained soldiers, (comprising non-commissioned officers, clerks, cooks, artificers and trumpeters), and if we complete this company to war strength of 150 men by the addition at one time of 125 new recruits, this personnel will give the best results possible when devoted exclusively to the training of such a company. This arrangement will give the permanent personnel full work to occupy their entire time, and this number of new and uninstructed men will be the maximum that can be handled by this group of instructors, with that individual care and attention that is necessary, in order to secure the best and quickest results. Military opinion is settled that such a unit as this will result in the maximum of *training with the minimum expenditures* of time and material. This unit will function most economically for the purpose, because this is the correct adjustment of parts for the purpose.

*Primary
Organization*

Military experts agree that such a company as this is the primary unit of organization for the purpose. They substantially agree that these companies can

be best managed when grouped in battalions of four companies each, and can be best supervised when these battalions are grouped into regiments of three battalions each, with the two administrative companies of the regiment in addition, as separate units belonging to the regiment, but not attached to any battalion.

Regimental Personnel Such a regiment would have a Permanent Personnel of 49 commissioned officers and 350 enlisted men. Its Transient Personnel would be 1,750 enlisted men, each man under instruction for a period of one year. Its output, its product, considered as a manufacturing plant, would be 1,750 Minute Men per year.

Additional Data Required This will furnish a basis on which to estimate the total number of Permanent Personnel required in the Training School section of the military service, in order to make available the 500,000 required for the national defense; but before we can reach exact figures it will be necessary to know how long the obligation of the Minute Man is to last, after he completes his year of training. Without entering at this point into the calculations by which the term was reached, it is enough to say that an obligation of four years, of which the first year will be spent in the Training School, will be found to establish a just balance between the permanent and transient personnel, by which the required total force can be

made available, the most approved system of recruitment adopted for both peace and war, and the cost of the system reduced to the absolute minimum, because all its parts can be worked most economically at *the rate of maximum efficiency* both in peace and in war. Therefore, the following periods of obligation will be assumed:

Training School, one year.

Minute Men Obligation, after completion of Training School, three years.

Estimate of Product The output, or manufactured product, of each regiment of the Training School

School will be 1,750 trained men per year. This gives a total of 5,250 trained men at the end of the third year, all under Minute Man Obligation for one year, one-third of them for two years, and one-third of them for three years. We will thus have, at the end of three years 5,250 trained men per regiment, ready for immediate duty, in addition to 350 men of the permanent personnel in each regiment. This number will be maintained at all times thereafter, as long as the system remains in operation. The results of this system, during any part of the fourth year, may be summarized as follows:

84 regiments of Training School;

Minute Men, 5,250 men per regiment.....	440,800
Permanent Personnel, 350 men per regiment.....	29,400
Expeditionary Force, one Division on War Basis.....	20,000
Oversea Force, also on war basis, two Divisions.....	40,000
Coast Artillery Component of Oversea Force.....	10,000
Total well trained troops ready for service.....	540,200

Militia, on present basis.....	190,000
Training School, current class under training.....	147,000
Partially trained troops, soon available, for reinforcement..	967,000

This provides the 500,000 required; allows 40,000 for casualties; and provides a partially trained force, ready to supply losses.

Such a force as this would be, permanently available, ready for action as quickly as any possible enemy could be ready, would not only insure victory in case of war, but would be a practical insurance against the possibility of war. No nation or combination of nations, would care to attack a country prepared to meet attack with such a formidable force.

Résumé of Results The military forces of the United States under this system would consist of:

I. The Permanent Personnel.

- (a) Oversea Defense, two divisions, war basis, and complete coast artillery component.
- (b) Expeditionary Force, one division, war basis.
- (c) Training School element, 84 regiments or equivalents, on training school basis of 3 commissioned officers and 25 picked enlisted men per company.

II. The Minute Man Reserve.

This would consist of all men who had completed the full year of prescribed training

and who had not completed four years of obligation. They would be on the legal status of Furlough, subject to call whenever so authorized by Congress, but armed and equipped, ready for immediate mobilization.

III. The class under current instruction at the Training School.

IV. The National Guard, which should be developed paripassu, with the other forces of the country, because it is the constitutional check against overdevelopment of the regular army and against possible militarism.

Actual Force Available Making due allowance for casualties, and for men who would fail to respond at once, this system would make immediately available half a million well trained men; would place 267,000 more on the fighting line (at least a quarter of a million) in about three months, and can be so managed as to establish adequate recruiting and training depots from which well trained men can be constantly supplied to replace losses and maintain the full strength of the fighting line.

CHAPTER V.

FINANCIAL ESTIMATES.

*Preceding
Estimates
Necessary* No estimate worthy of the name as to expense could be made, until the size and character of the forces to be considered were determined. Having reached a reasonable conclusion on these points, it is possible to estimate the cost. We need not consider the cost of material, for no matter what system be adopted that expense will be to meet. Most of the material for the infantry and cavalry elements is already in existence, and a good part of the material for mobile artillery has already been fabricated. Whatever the cost may be, we can be sure that it will be less with a well trained, properly organized, adequate force than it will be with a less efficient and less effective force. We may now proceed to estimate the Financial Problem of preparation of the personnel required for the National Defense.

*Pay and Allowances of
Permanent Personnel* From the foregoing discussion it will be logical to estimate for the permanent personnel on the same basis of pay and allowances, as now established by law. The total number of enlisted men provided for above, is about 50,000 for oversea service, 20,000 for expeditionary force, and 29,400 for the training school permanent personnel, making an aggregate of 99,400 men.

This is not very far from the number now authorized by law, and the appropriations for this element will remain about the same as the current ones.

In order to provide for the permanent commissioned personnel of the training school element, however, there will necessarily be an increase in the number of organizations, and consequently in the number of officers. This is not a scheme for the advancement of promotion, nor would any increase of commissioned officers be recommended, if it were possible to avoid such recommendation. It is not possible. In order to institute the system, certain officers will be necessary. The system is the only one possible, to meet the requirements of our national necessities, and therefore the necessary personnel, both enlisted and commissioned, must be provided in order to put it into operation.

The necessity for this increase in commissioned personnel will be apparent in a broad way, when it is considered that the task of training annually 147,000 recruits is to be added to all the present duties of the regular army. How this great task is to be accomplished with a very small increase in commissioned personnel will be duly explained in its proper place, and the feasibility of the plan will be fully apparent. Not one vacancy is to be created for purposes of promotion; not a single officer asked for whose services are not absolutely indispensable.

Additional Officers Our present permanent force amounts to the equivalent of 80 regiments. This number of regiments will be increased under the plan herein proposed, by placing the training school element on a training school basis, composed of a cadre of 25 enlisted men per company selected for duty with a view to their fitness, and a complete personnel of commissioned officers. The total number of regiments, or equivalent bodies, required for the whole permanent personnel, on the basis assumed is 138. This will require an increase in commissioned personnel of very nearly 75 per cent, and will be the only item in which the expenses of the permanent establishment will be increased in any way.

On the other hand, there will be economies by utilizing a better system of organization, by decrease in changes of station, by decrease in the retired list, and by more economical operation of the whole system in a businesslike way, that will practically offset this increase of expense, leaving the appropriations for the permanent establishment very nearly the same as they now are. The cost, therefore, of the Permanent Personnel, will be very nearly one hundred millions per year, \$100,000,000.

The Analogy again The Banker who employs a skilled architect and contractor, to estimate for the construction of his mansion must rely upon their technical knowledge and skill

in the minor details. It would be absurd for the Banker to try to figure out the number of carpenters, plasterers, stonemasons, bricklayers, plumbers, and what not, required for the work. Knowledge of these details is one of the prime essentials of the training of the architect and of the contractor, but it is not part of the Banker's training. Similarly, knowledge of how many signalmen, how many infantry, cavalry, artillery, airmen and the like, and of how many officers will be required to properly instruct, train and direct these workmen, is technical military knowledge that should be within the scope of training of the expert army officer (and is part of his training), is a matter of daily experience with him, but is not within the training or experience of the average citizen or congressman. Here the citizen and the congressman must depend upon the integrity and the judgment of the trained military expert.

It is correct to say, further, that some officers have had more training, more experience, and have better judgment than some other officers. We cannot all be experts in every line of military activity. One may be an expert school man, another an expert tactician, another an expert Surgeon another expert in law, and so on. Comparatively few are experts in economics, or give to that subject a single thought; yet economics must be the real foundation of any successful military system. No system that

takes large numbers of young men from industrial activity can secure approval in our country, or would be successful. No system that will financially exhaust the country can be successful; yet the plan of General W. H. Carter, the officer who had more to do with the legislation of 1901, than any other, and to whom Secretary Root, gave most of the credit for the "General Staff," the most experienced officer alive in our service in matters of legislation and organization, entirely omits consideration of the cost of his plan, dismisses it with the brief remark, that it would cost more than the present system (Page 150, "The American Army," by General W. H. Carter, published 1915); and the proposed "Continental Army Plan" would bring the country face to face with either a heavy increase of taxes or a bond issue for our descendants to pay, for a line of purely experimental organization, the results of which can never possibly produce a well trained military force under any conceivable circumstances.

So, while the estimate for National Defense must be made by trained regular officers, it is not every one of them who is capable of devising a sound plan, or even of appreciating it after it is proposed by some one else. The best minds in the country have worked on this problem, from General Washington, down to the present time. The final result, a plan that will really work, must be from a special

student of organization; and if he should fail to present a perfect plan it will be no discredit to be listed in the same category as Washington, Grant, Upton, Root and Carter.

Cost of Transient Personnel Before we can make a rational estimate of the cost of the transient personnel two things must be determined; the number to be paid, and the rate of pay. The rest is merely a question of arithmetic. We have the data as to numbers in the foregoing discussion. It remains to consider what pay shall be allotted to this element of the National Defense, and what allowances they shall receive.

Theory of the Military Obligation It is proposed to finance this element on the theory that military service in time of war, and the necessary preparation for that service in time of peace, are an obligation of citizenship, due to the nation from every able-bodied citizen, and for the discharge of which duty he is not entitled to one cent of pay. The moment this theory is adopted the Nation can adopt a system that will not compete with industrial activities, and will not bankrupt the country when war comes, at the time when of all others its financial resources must be conserved and safeguarded in order that the nation may live.

Application of the Volunteer System The adoption of this idea, however, need not exclude the use of volunteers, nor radically alter our methods of securing adequate enrollment.

In our country, only a relatively small force, compared to the total population, will ever be needed, even in a great war, if that force be properly trained in advance. There is a solution of the problem that permits a happy application of the principle of voluntary military service from patriotic motives, while yet asserting legally the doctrine of military obligation, and making all necessary arrangements for the application of that idea, when such application is necessary. That such a provision for obligatory service is necessary in time of war, has been proved in every war in our history; and the necessary machinery must be provided for in time of peace to enforce military service whenever that may be necessary.

Compulsory Peace Training Necessary for Adequate Preparedness If the nation reserves and enforces the right to use the draft in time of war, it must also reserve and, if necessary, enforce compulsory military training in time of peace, in order to have available competent personnel in time of war. Modern conditions require adequate preliminary military training before war begins. To send absolutely untrained men up against trained soldiers, under present conditions, is an unspeakable crime, entailing useless and horrible butchery. Adequate preliminary training of a sufficient number for insurance against war, a sufficient number to prevent rapid conquest of large areas of our

territory by a better prepared enemy, is a necessity of the present world conditions and environment of our country. Surely no argument is necessary on this subject. It should be sufficient to point to Belgium and France; to merely mention August, 1914. And if a sufficient number of citizens will not take such preliminary training of their own accord, upon the assurance of the law that they will not be called upon for war service, except for the National Defense, there is nothing left for the nation but to assert and enforce its undoubted right to require such training of an adequate number in a fair and impartial manner.

*Combination of
Compulsory and
Voluntary Service* So our country must assert its right to the military services of its citizens in time of war, and to their proper training in time of peace for that duty; at least to the proper training of the half million necessary to insure our country against the fate of Belgium. In doing so, however, there can be no objection to calling to the Colors first those who desire to voluntarily discharge this duty, nor to offering a reasonable inducement to these volunteers. If a citizen voluntarily offers himself not only for service in time of war, but also to take the personal training in time of peace that will fit him to be useful in time of war, that citizen certainly merits more at the hands of his country, than the one who fails to defend her, or refuses to

take such training, and compels her to resort to force to compel him to unwillingly discharge his duty.

A system that would give preference to the patriotic volunteer, without inflicting any hardship upon the citizen who does not volunteer, would therefore commend itself to all right thinking people.

Inducements for Volunteers Such a system would be to offer a reasonable inducement for voluntary applications to take the peace time training, with its obligation to three years of Minute Man readiness, and to draft the balance necessary from those who do not volunteer, but without the same inducement. If the inducement secured an adequate number of volunteers there would be no draft; but if it failed to do so enough men of military age would be drafted to secure the necessary number. The method of applying this idea is reserved for later discussion, but the amount of the obligation and of the inducement should be proposed here in order to furnish a basis for financial estimates for the Transient Personnel.

Obligation and Status of Transient Personnel The obligation, in point of time, should cover four years, in order to provide for the most economical and effective system of training. Of this period the first year would be devoted to military and vocational instruction and training and this is the only period, ex-

cept in time of actual war, when the volunteer would be separated from civil pursuits. This year can be arranged at a time in a man's life when the interruption will be minimum, and the training can be arranged in many cases to be vocational training which will be of direct advantage to the man in civil life. In all cases military training is distinctly beneficial, both physically and morally, to every man who takes it, making him a better man in health, physique and personal hygiene, a better man morally and intellectually, than he would have been without it.

It is not asserted that every man who receives military training is a better man than every man who does not, but it is a fact that every man who takes it is a better man all the days of his life, physically, morally and mentally, than he would have been without it. The military art embraces all other arts, and military training calls for experts in all departments of human activity. Young men who desire to fit themselves for any trade or profession can find in the army an opportunity to learn practically the work of that trade or that profession, and there is no reason why we should not take economic advantage of this fact by assigning volunteers to those places in the military machine where they will receive instruction as far as possible in the very trade or profession which they intend to practice in civil life after their year of training. This

can be made part of the inducement to suitable men to take their year of military training, and should be made a strong inducement to them in any rational scheme for such training.

During the other three years, the man's status would be that of military furlough, without pay or allowances, except as will be stated in the next paragraph of this discussion. Furlough is a definite military status, which holds the man ready to obey orders at a moment's notice, yet leaves him free to go where he pleases, and do what he likes until the call is made. We are planning for National Defense, not aggression; and in the law which will be necessary to put this plan into operation it can be provided that these "Minute Men" shall not be called upon, except in case of special authorization by the Congress of the United States. This will insure them against unnecessary interruptions of their activities in civil life during this three years of Minute Man obligation, and will yet maintain them in a status of readiness for immediate service in case of real necessity. They would be available upon proclamation of the President, pursuant to authorization by Congress to issue such a call.

Bounty The financial inducement proposed is a net bounty of one hundred dollars per year, to be paid to the volunteer upon the expiration of each year of his services. His food, clothing, equipment, traveling expenses and care in case of

sickness in line of duty, are legitimate public expenses in any case, whether he be volunteer or a drafted man; but the drafted man has no claim to bounty. Neither of them has any claim to pay, as the military duty is to be performed as a public obligation, just the same as a poll tax.

The Theory of Bounties The theory on which any cash bounty can be offered rests on the idea that since comparatively few men are required it is better to utilize the services of those who are willing to perform the duty voluntarily than to make haphazard selection by the draft; and since the voluntary service of these men exempts an equal number of others, it is no more than just and right that those exempted should make some cash return to those who serve voluntarily.

It may be doubted whether the amount proposed is adequate. There is no fixed principle involved in the estimate of \$100 per year. Any other amount, so long as it is strictly accounted an equivalent rendered by those who do not serve to those who do serve voluntarily, would comply equally with all the ethical and logical conditions of the problem, provided the desired result be secured. The principle is that the nation needs a certain number of trained men, has a right to call for them, and that those who are not willing to do their share in person ought to pay a proper cash indemnity to those who relieve them of doing their personal share of this duty.

This is a matter of principle; the amount to be paid is a matter of expediency and of convenience.

It is set forth as a principle that every citizen owes to his country the duty of defense in time of danger. It is a principle that every man should be so trained that his personal service will be efficient. It is a fact that this training must be given in time of peace, in order to make it adequately effective, under modern conditions of warfare. It is a principle that the man who is exempted by the law from rendering this personal service in time of war, or taking the necessary training in time of peace to be effective in time of war, should contribute an equivalent in cash for the benefit of the man who takes his place and thereby enables the exempt citizen to exercise his free choice in the matter.

The exact amount will be fixed by the law of supply and demand, like the pay for all other personal services; for every man who volunteers to take the necessary training in time of peace, and to stand ready for war service during a period of three years after completion of his training period, will be rendering a personal service to every man who does not so volunteer. This service consists in assuming a part of the moral and legal obligations of the non-volunteer, and of rendering a personal service to the nation that the non-volunteer is morally and legally bound to render, unless this man volunteers,

all of which the volunteer assumes in addition to his own share of the military duty, which is the same as that incumbent upon every other citizen.

Understanding, then, that the amount to be paid as a bounty to the volunteer is open to discussion, it is thought that \$100 per year, taken with the other inducements, will be enough for the purpose.

*Is \$100 per
year enough?*

The volunteer for this training has no necessary expenses incident to the duty. The necessary expenses are a charge on the government. His age must be taken into consideration. It is very desirable to secure young men for this training; from 19 to 23 years of age. The earlier in life this military obligation is discharged the better, in order that men may be free to assume civic obligations that might be broken up by military service. It is desirable to enroll recruits while they are still young enough to be plastic in mind and body. After a man passes 25 years of age something of the plasticity of youth is usually lost. Military training is infinitely more beneficial to the young man than to one of middle age.

The class sought, therefore, is the young high school graduate, the recent college graduate, the young mechanic of about the same age. For the young high school graduate who lacks the financial resources to enter college a guarantee of \$100 per year would mean a college education, if he is worth

his salt. To the recent graduate of college, without the funds with which to begin a professional career, a guarantee of \$100 per year would mean financial independence. The young farmer or mechanic who had \$100 per year for three years in sight would have a very great advantage in his first three lean years. To all these classes such a proposition would appeal very strongly, and the number included in these classes is enormous. As a matter of expediency it would probably be better to pay it in a lump sum at the end of each year.

*Allowance for
Expense Money*

It is believed that the sum proposed would be adequate to secure as many volunteers for the training as would be necessary. Possibly it would be advisable to also make a small allowance weekly for pocket money while with the colors; say a dollar a week. This would be a trifling addition to the expense, and would greatly promote contentment among the men.

*Another
Inducement*

In addition to the general training and to the vocational training in many cases, and to the bounty proposed, there is one more inducement that should be held out for voluntary service. There will be many officers to appoint, both in time of peace and in war. It should be a fundamental rule that no drafted man should be eligible to any such appointment, whether it be to the commissioned rank or only to the tempor-

ary duty of an acting lance corporal. The man who has to be forced to perform his military duty should never be placed in a position of authority above the one who voluntarily assumed his military obligation. Eligibility to promotion, opportunity to win rank and command, would be therefore added as a powerful incentive to every young man to come forward and offer to take the proper training that would fit him for military duty. These inducements would probably result in more than the required number of voluntary applications, which would be only 147,000 per year in our great country. That year would be better than one year of ordinary college training for every young man, and would be passed at a time in life when every young man craves novelty, adventure, and a chance to see the world. If these inducements should fail to produce the full number required, then it would be necessary to exert the full power of the government to secure the additional number required.

*Machinery for
Application
of the system*

As it is necessary that the fundamental right of the nation to require military service of all its citizens in time of war shall be reasserted, and as this carries with it the right to require them to take the indispensable personal training in time of peace, so the means should be provided to make this provision of the plan real and effective. It is necessary that the machinery for enforcement

of this phase of the law shall be provided in time of peace, that it be tested by actual operation, that the people become accustomed to its operation. From this point of view it is rather desirable than otherwise that the number of applicants for voluntary training should fall somewhat short of 147,000, in order that the other provisions of the law, effective only upon such shortage, may become effective in time of peace, and the machinery operated for practice before war is upon us.

Compulsory Service Therefore, in case there be not enough applicants who can pass the physical requirements to fill up the annual quota of 147,000 for any year, resort should be had to compulsory service of a sufficient number to complete the annual quota. For this purpose complete lists of all men of military age should be established, card indexed, and provisions made by which immediately after closing the list of voluntary applicants, say one month before the beginning of the year of military training, the required number should be selected by the best practicable system, notified when and where to report for duty, and compelled to obey the notice. There would be, however, this difference; those thus drafted for service would not become eligible for any promotion during their four years of obligatory service, nor would they receive any of the bounty which would be paid to the men who take the training

voluntarily, nor should any drafted man be ever eligible to receive a dollar of pension in case of injury.

*No Pay,
No Bounty,
No Promotion,
No Pension,
for Drafted Men*

This provision of the law should be rigid. In this provision lies the binding force, the "Sanction" of the law, which will make it effective. This provision is the tangible assertion of the right of the Nation to live, its right to self defense in order that it may live. This provision of the law will insure that each annual quota will be full. It will forever put an end to anarchy and twaddle about "peace at any price," "horrors of war," benefits of "pacifism," and all the other milksop, mollicoddle nonsense that has been so much preached in our country in the last few years. If this plan were of possible use for aggression against any other country there might be some objection to it; but *its very foundation is in self defense*, its antithesis is aggression. It is hedged about by the provision that these Minute Men cannot be called out without the sanction of Congress, by whom they can be called out anyway, whether or not. Its only object is to make these men effective and efficient for national defense, and for no other purpose. Any person who opposes adequate provision for that is a traitor, unworthy to live in our country and enjoy the benefits of its institutions. There may be dis-

agreement as to what preparation is required and necessary. Those who are without military training and who oppose this plan may justify their opposition by their ignorance; but even they can only maintain that some other plan is, in their opinion, better. No patriot, no loyal citizen, no sane and honest person, will dispute that adequate and proper provisions should be made for the national defense. It is for those who oppose this plan to propose a better one; and when they do so the author will be for it.

*Cost of Transient
Personnel,*

\$58, 800, 000 per year

Assuming this as a working basis, then, the best one practicable under the present political conditions of the United States, we are now able to make an intelligent estimate of the cost of the Transient Personnel for the National Defense. Our discussion calls for the equivalent of 84 regiments in the training school for Minute Men, each of which is to instruct 1750 Minute Men annually, and these Minute Men are to assume the military obligation of standing ready for a period of three years after the completion of their instruction in the training school. Assuming that there are enough voluntary applications, so that every Minute Man will receive the bounty, and that there are no discharges, we reach the maximum number at the end of the 4th year, which is 441,000 Minute Men standing ready, and

147,000 in the then current class under instruction. With the beginning of the 5th year one entire class of Minute Men will be discharged from their obligation, and from that time on there will be always 588,000 men drawing the bounty of \$100 per man per year; a total of \$58,800,000, per year.

This amount will be in addition to the present appropriations made for military expenses, and in return for this money, if this plan be adopted for the National Defense, there will always be available for instant service the following trained forces:

Trained and Ready.	{	Two Divisions Oversea Forces	40,000	
		One Division, Expeditionary Force	20,000	
		Oversea Coast Artillery Component	10,000	
		Minute Men, Trained and Equipped	441,000	
		<hr/>		
		Trained Total	511,000	
Partially Trained for Reinforcements.	{	Minute Men, partially trained, fully equipped, stiffened by 25 selected old soldiers per company, with picked officers	168,000	
		National Guard, as at present organized	120,000	
			<hr/>	
		Total reinforcement	288,000	
		<hr/>		
		Aggregate	799,000	

And the total cost of this huge force, which would forever guarantee the peace of the Western Hemisphere, would be only fifty-nine million dollars per year more than we are paying for our present imbecility.

Other Plans Proposed It may be worth while to compare this plan with other plans that have been proposed. A scheme has been made public, the fundamental feature of which is a

"Continental Army." This plan proposes some such idea as a regiment to each congressional district; about 400 regiments or equivalent if carried out on that basis. The cost has been omitted from published estimates. If these men are to be paid on the same basis as the present army such a force would cost eight hundred million dollars per year. It is proposed to give these "Continental" two months training per year, presumably under canvas, the most expensive shelter ever devised for troops. If paid for *only the actual time* under training under this scheme at the same rate as the present regular army schedule, the cost would be one sixth of eight hundred millions, or \$133,333,333 per year in addition to present appropriations. This is more than twice as much as the foregoing plan would cost. If we count the two months casual training that would be possible under the proposed "Continental" system as of value equal to the solid and thorough training above proposed in this plan, the "Continental" would receive only six months training in three years, or only half as much training, in three widely separated periods of two months each. The "Continental" would have to be mobilized and demobilized three times to get one half as many days of instruction. When we come to plans for mobilization, which imply sound organization, we shall see that the plan herein proposed is capable of

being effective because it is sound and correct. No military man who considers the "Continental" plan from a purely military standpoint can honestly say that the proposed training would be of any real value, or the system capable of effective use in the first six months of a real year.

General W. H. Carter has proposed a plan based on the Congressional Districts in his last work, *The American Army*, recently published. In many respects General Carter's plan shows logical thought and wide information; but on three vital points it utterly fails. These vital points are:

1. Complete failure to estimate the cost. General Carter dismisses this element of the subject with a dozen words, and without a single estimate of expenses.

2. We find no indication of how men are to be supplied for his proposed volunteer army. The National Guard has reached its possible without federal pay; patriotism, unsupported, can do no more. It is not apparent in what manner the federal volunteers outlined in General Carter's scheme are to be obtained in time of peace, nor how they are to be paid, nor how much. Without adequate provision on these points no plan whatever is practicable.

3. We look in vain in "The American Army" for any system of organization on practical lines which would be ready for immediate use; it might

be possible to organize these "Federal Volunteers" if we were to have as much time as President Lincoln; but this possibility is vetoed by the events of August, 1914.

With so many vital defects, no plan, however illustrious its author, measures up to the national requirements. The proposal of the Secretary of War in 1914, to merely add about 25,000 men and a thousand officers to the regular army, is ludicrous. No well informed military man would give such a proposal a second thought with the problem of real National Defense under consideration.

SUMMARY OF ESTIMATES:

1. Men.

Trained, Organized and equipped, ready at once ...	511,000
National Guards, available for reinforcements	120,000
Personnel for Training School Depot	168,000

Aggregate	799,000
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2. Cost.

Permanent Personnel, per year	\$100,000,000
Transient Personnel, per year	59,000,000

These estimates apply both in time of war and
in time of peace.

Total cost of complete preparedness (personnel)	\$159,000,000
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CHAPTER VI.

THE ALTERNATIVE.

Two Possibilities One is a sufficient increase of the regular army to meet any possible emergency. This would require a standing army of a half million men, and would cost \$5,000,000,000 per year. . It would take at least ten years to develop such an army, if Congress were to enact the necessary legislation this coming session, if we are to go along the present lines of inefficiency from the standpoint of National Defense. Nothing more need be said. The thing is not only impossible; it is undesirable. It would be not only a crime against the industries and institutions of our country, but also a blunder of the worst sort.

The other possibility is the development of the militia to such a state of numbers and efficiency that it will supply the needs of the National Defense. There are insuperable objections to this alternative.

In the first place, the constitutional function of the militia is that of a state force, available for only three possible contingencies for national use. To make it available for oversea or expeditionary use an amendment to the constitution would be necessary. Tinkering with that charter of human liberty might be excused if there were the least

necessity for it; but ample authority is given to Congress by the constitution under the general war, power to levy and maintain armies, and there is no occasion to tinker with the constitution. All that is necessary is for Congress to exercise its proper power in relation to this subject. Tinkering with the constitution, in addition to being dangerous to American institutions, is also a slow business; and if the national security depends upon such an amendment as that there is little probability that national defense will be attended to in time to ward off or meet the approaching danger.

In the second place, the militia is not, and from its very nature, cannot be made a suitable force for national defense or for offensive use. It has never yet developed its own personnel to anything like "Minute Man" efficiency and has never given any reason to believe that it can do so. It must inevitably undergo a federalizing reorganization in case of war, eliminate the unfit, and recruit with green men to war strength. This is a permanent condition with all militia organizations, cannot be removed by legislation, and will forever prevent the militia, as a body, from ever attaining such standards as would qualify it for immediate duty against well trained troops in case of war. There are individual exceptions, of course; Moriarity's regiment was fit in 1898, and went instantly, as it stood; but the 71st New York also went as it stood, and

took the place that should have been taken by effective troops; and the 7th New York, with its years of boasting about its readiness and efficiency, did not go at all—refused to go, just as New York militia refused to go to Queenstown. There is no way of overcoming this defect, which is inherent in the militia system. We cannot build the defense of our country safely out of such material; thighs of brass and feet of clay. We must have homogeneous material, and all of it trained to a high degree of excellence, when we come to our death grapple of Liège or the Marne.

Another vital objection to the militia system is financial. We would have 48 different states spending money to be repaid from the Federal Treasury, without a check during the period of organization. If all other defects could be overcome, this one alone would prohibit the use of state troops in time of war. It bankrupted the country in the War of the Revolution; strained its resources to the elastic limit in 1814-15; bankrupted the nation again in 1863; and imposed hundreds of millions of unnecessary expense in 1898. Why not learn from the School of Experience?

To increase the regular army to a half million would be impossible in time of peace without conscription; and the American people will not submit to conscription except as a last resort. If the thing could be done it would withdraw that many

men from the productive activity in the industries of the country, and would establish a military caste which would mark the beginning of the "Decline and Fall" of republican America.

To attract half a million to the militia service would be equally impossible, and would be open to the objection that it would organize a politico-military clique in politics that would be even more dangerous to free institutions than a regular establishment which cannot vote. It is with the very greatest difficulty now that militia organizations maintain a strength sufficient to draw their federal pay. To increase their enrollment very much would be an impossibility.

No. All these alternatives are futile. None of them can succeed. Like every problem, there is one correct solution; and the one herein proposed is the correct solution of the problem of National Defense. The one reason in its favor that outweighs all others is that *it will work*. The one reason against all the others that is decisive is that *they will not work; none of them will work*.

Under this plan the permanent personnel will become a productive body. The regular army will become a well regulated factory, in which will be elaborated the units of National Defense. Having a definite, tangible object to accomplish, it will be systematically organized to do that work in the most economical manner. Its product will be Na-

tional Security, guaranteed by the trained men turned out from this factory ready to command this security by force against any aggressor. It will not withdraw a man from productive activity, *but will educate 147,000 young men each year for greater economic value in a training school, without an equal, and return them at once to productive industries with their practical value greatly increased.* This factory of national security will produce trained men for that purpose, and will maintain an adequate number always in a state of satisfactory training. This has never yet been done by any system in our country, and cannot be done by any other system that has ever been proposed.

How these Results will be reached The discussion has thus far related, primarily to the financial side of the problem. Estimates of numbers and details of methods have been given only to enable us to reach a sound conclusion as to the necessary cost. In that connection it was not practicable to discuss methods of organization or training, or to explain in detail how the different elements of the proposed training school would be distributed to accomplish the results desired.

A contractor, however, would go into details in his estimates. He would determine how many bricklayers, stonemasons, carpenters, painters, experts and unskilled laborers, would be required for his contract. In the same way this discussion

should show the organization, subdivision, maintenance and operation, of the forces proposed; how many men would be assigned to each element, as infantry, cavalry, machine guns, mobile artillerymen, coast defense, special units, etc.; how the 147,000 members of the annual class of Minute Men would be distributed among these units, and how the necessary trained officers would be provided for them. This is technical discussion, and should be given in a work of this kind, in order that the estimates may be revised by other military men. But it belongs in subsequent chapters. The preceding chapters are intended as a financial summary, with incidental analysis of the proposed system enough to make it intelligible. The technical discussions follow in subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER VII.

PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF MILITARY ORGANIZATION.

Purpose of Discussion We have reached a satisfactory financial estimate on a sound basis for the National Defense. It is now proposed to deduce a suitable system of organization to insure the maximum return for the expenditure. Let us continue the analogy of the contractor.

The banker determines that the necessities of his position require the erection of a mansion on a site selected by him. In a general way, from knowledge of what other men in a similar condition of life are using, he knows about what sort of a mansion he wants, and so he goes to a competent architect for detailed plans. With these plans he engages a competent contractor for the purpose of embodying in steel, stone, wood and plaster, the conception which originated in his own mind, which was embodied in working plans by the architect, and is to be executed by the contractor. The Banker is not himself an architect, nor a skilled builder; yet he can tell by the use of ordinary common sense whether or not the plans of the architect embody his idea, and whether or not the contractor is faithfully executing these plans, provided he pays enough attention to the matter. If he does not pay attention

to it he must rely upon the integrity of his employees for its faithful execution.

The Application So in this matter of the National Defense. Congress, for the American people, may take the place of the Banker; it is the agent of the nation, charged on the oaths of office of its members with the duty of providing for the National Defense. He who formulates the plans may be compared to the architect, and he who supervises their execution may represent the contractor. The military experts of the General Staff, to whom any such plans will no doubt be referred before their approval, may be likened to a body of consulting architects who finally approve the first draft of the architect's plans, after such alterations as may be found necessary. The Permanent Personnel of the army is the working force of the Secretary of War, who stands in the relation of overseer of the work. The part essayed by the present writer is that of draftsman, making an attempt to formulate the first rough draft of a workable plan.

Previous Plans The subject of National Defense has never been considered on a permanent basis by Congress, and but few military men have done more than try to meet the emergencies of the passing day as best they could with a makeshift expedient.

Upton, the most brilliant mind our military system has ever produced, rendered a great service by showing how it should not be done; but his constructive suggestions are too vague for practical use. Carter, a great constructive mind of our time, shows conclusively the necessity for half a million men, but when we come to details his project lacks the definite, clear-cut sharpness necessary for constructive work. Furthermore, his plans would entail national bankruptcy in case of a real war. Wagner was the great constructive military mind between Upton and Carter; but Wagner's work related wholly to two details, viz.; infantry organization and scholastic instruction. The results of his work may be summed up in two items; the 3-battalion organization and the scholastic system for instruction of commissioned officers. It does not cover preparation for national defense in any particular. In the same way Carter's great work is the General Staff and the detailed staff system, a great detail, but a mere detail in the great question we are now at work on, and that detail relating to the minor, almost negligible, organization of what we know as "The Regular Army."

No Satisfactory All these were steps forward,
Plan in Existence but neither as separate steps,
nor as a jumbled whole without articulation into any sort of system worthy of the name, do these steps bring to the nation any

real preparation for self defense. It is just for that very reason, that none of those who have worked on the military work of the nation has produced a real system, that we can take their measure and say that Upton's mind has not yet been surpassed in our military history.

These men have done some pretty big thinking; some thinking in five figures; but as the late Thomas B. Reed said, "This is a billion dollar country." We must think in ten figures, not five; for a century, not for the political exigencies of a moment or one election or to gain a little promotion. So far as I know, there has never yet been formulated any comprehensive plan for the National Defense, based upon correct principles, worked out to detail enough to make it practicable, looking to a permanent solution of this problem.

The National Defense has been left to be dealt with when the crisis arrives, by those who may be temporarily responsible for the public safety. The methods adopted have always resulted from the exigencies of the moment, and these exigencies have more often been political than military. For example, I happen to know that on the 26th of February, 1899, it was a purely political exigency that impelled President McKinley to accept short term volunteers under the Cockrell plan, in lieu of an adequate increase of the regular army, under the Hawley bill, then pending; I know this on state-

ments made to me, personally, by both Senator Cockrell and President McKinley. A similar political consideration forced short term, state militia and volunteers upon President Lincoln in 1861. It is quite possible that a like political exigency has resulted in the plan for a "Continental" army, now under public consideration. The national peril from lack of any sort of preparation for self defense, has grown exactly in the same ratio as the military growth of other nations, and the world expansion of our own country, exactly in proportion to the tremendous advances in transportation, in proportion to the invention of more scientific methods of warfare.

This peril has grown until it looms up today as the one and only great issue before our country. The very life of the nation is at stake, or may be at stake at the will of any one of half a dozen nations. That life cannot be safeguarded by "scraps of paper." It must be protected by adequate preparation for self defense, permanent preparation, instead of patchwork, put together for reasons of political expediency. This preparation cannot be made after the enemy strikes. It must be made in advance, in time of peace, by men who will probably not be officially responsible when the time of trial comes, because they will have gone out of office, but who will be responsible in History, for either lack of foresight and capacity, or lack of moral courage,

to do what they well know they ought to do. The first public man who can take a national position, as champion of this idea, will deserve to be elected President, and will become President upon this issue, if the people can still have their way. The people of the United States are neither "sissies" nor "mollycoddles," neither cowards nor degenerates. They are just as ready to defend their country, and to make adequate, timely preparation to defend it, as ever their forefathers were. And they are fast awakening to the importance of immediate action on that line.

Pioneer Work This will be my excuse for consulting principles, rather than precedents, common sense, rather than common politics, in formulating such a scheme of organization. It is a form of pioneering. The ancient landmarks of the military art have been swept away. Trained imagination, the "Vision" of the seer, rather than the laborious patience of the military pedant and compiler, are demanded in the solution of this problem. The architect who planned the first steel skyscraper was not much helped by previous formulæ.

No Statistics are now of Value Compilation of past statistics will not do in our present situation. We must not repeat the mistakes of Lincoln and McKinley in organization. A revolution has occurred in the art of war. Such mistakes would now be fatal. The machine gun, the

aeroplane, the 42-centimeter, 20-mile artillery hurling asphyxiating gas, wireless communication from the sky for fire direction, the automobile transportation, have so revolutionized equipment, tactics and organization, that statistics or opinions prior to 1914 are of little value. Accurate knowledge of the military details of 1914-1915 will not be available for many months. Our need for an organization which will be capable of utilizing that knowledge promptly when it becomes available, is imperative. Our possible future enemies already have all this knowledge, and have already taken full advantage of it in their organization. We know that our present disorganization, or present lack of a system (for we have none worthy of the name) will absolutely make it impossible to utilize new information for years. We must prepare to face an enemy who already has full information, already has full experience, has already perfected his armies in the use of every one of the new devices, many of which we do not yet know even by name. Just as surely as some nation, or group of nations is going to emerge from the clash in Europe as victor, just that surely the victor is going to demand "reparation" from the United States for alleged wrongs; just that surely we must stand and deliver upon demand, unless we prepare ourselves to defend our rights and our country. Our need is pressing. The only faculty that can grasp the situation is the trained

military imagination, using the critical lens of common sense, through the medium of clear, pitiless logic.

Declaration of Independence Therefore, in the details of organization to follow, I shall not permit myself to be dismayed because the plan is at variance with those previously submitted by distinguished officers. Less attention will be paid to precedents than to our needs. Sweeping changes of organization will be recommended; but with sure vision, clear vision, tested vision; I know what results will follow if the plan herein outlined be adopted, and know that it must be adopted, sooner or later, because it is right. *It will work.*

CHAPTER VIII.

THE PROPOSED ORGANIZATION.

Permanent One Division, complete, for the Philippine Islands.

Personnel One Division, complete, Hawaii and Panama.

One Division, complete, Expeditionary Force.

Ten Thousand Coast Artillery, Oversea Defense.

All these troops are to be established and maintained at all times on a war basis, ready for immediate action.

In addition, an adequate permanent personnel, as a part of the regular army, for a great training school of transient personnel, for the duty of Minute Men, to be used only for purposes of National Self Defense, when so authorized by special Act of Congress.

Composition of a Division A division is a body of troops complete within itself, for military purposes in the field. It is the smallest mobile force that contains all the elements necessary for complete independent action. It contains suitable proportions of infantry, cavalry, mobile artillery, machine guns, signal troops, sanitary troops, supply troops, transportation, and other auxiliary units, necessary for independent operations in its theater of operations. The composi-

tion of a division will vary with its theater of operations. For example, that for Panama, in a limited field, for passive defense only, is one thing; that for the Philippine Islands, where the theater of operations is very large and extremely diversified, is quite another thing. The composition of a division must depend upon the theater of its operations; that of an Expeditionary Division, must contain all the auxiliaries it is likely to need in any part of the world to which it may be sent, from Alaska to Jolo, from Cape Horn to Athabasca. The Expeditionary Division, therefore, may be taken as the complete one which must be organized, as the model, to be modified in the cases of other divisions, according to the particular requirements of their field of operation.

Analysis of Organization depends, primarily,
Organization upon equipment. The basic unit,
 in all cases, is that which can be
most effectively managed under the conditions
of its service by a single officer. It may be
subdivided; he may use assistants; each of these
assistants may have, probably will have, a sub-
division of the unit, or an allotment of the duties
pertaining to it; but the basic unit of all organiza-
tion, civil or military, economic, social or industrial,
is that number which can be most economically and
effectively controlled and used by one trained, cap-
able overseer, who is responsible for that unit, and
for the efficiency with which it is operated.

In the military service, it is customary to designate this unit as a company, and it is commanded by a captain.

Analogies In construction work, such a unit would be a "gang," and its overseer would correspond to a captain. In construction work, a convenient number of such "gangs" would be grouped under a superintendent, each gang doing its own work under its own overseer. Similarly, in an army companies are grouped for tactical management into battalions, and into regiments for administrative direction. This is part of the technical side of the military art, and it is just as difficult to explain the reasons for the particular grouping adopted in an army to a non-military man, as it is for a boss mechanic to explain to a person totally ignorant of machine shop practice why his workmen are distributed thus and so. In both cases the non-expert has employed a technical expert to manage this distribution, and on matters of technical detail it is logical and correct to accept the views of the technical expert within the scope of his proper duties.

*Utilize what
Organization we
already have, as
far as it can be
Utilized*

There are two phases to this organization problem. One relates to Permanent Personnel, the other to Transient Personnel. In the Permanent Personnel there are two divisions of the problem; that part always on a war basis, and that part which

will be the permanent element of the training school for Minute Men. These two parts of the Permanent Personnel may be treated separately, commencing with that part which will be always on a war basis; the oversea defense and the expeditionary force.

It is true that great changes in equipment, with corresponding changes in organization, are imminently impending. The automatic rifle is about to displace the present rifle for infantry. The separate machine gun corps is now recognized as a necessity, and England has adopted it under the stress of the present war. With the adoption of this corps will disappear the hybrid organization in which machine guns form a part of each regiment. It ought never have been adopted, and never would have been adopted, if any sort of machine gun organization could have been secured in any other way.

The old officers did not want machine guns organized at all. Now, perhaps, after England has shown us how, we may get them correctly organized. An aero service must be recognized as a necessity; not one run by men who cannot fly, but run by bird men who can themselves fly, and know what is necessary for that branch of the service by personal experience. Automobile transportation is with us to stay, and must be organized. We have none. Artillery material must be brought up to date again.

If Germany can produce a 42-centimeter mobile gun, it is not beyond American inventive genius to produce a better one. The day of anchoring the personnel of the sea coast fortifications in concrete emplacements is past. Their great guns should be as mobile, within their theater of operations, as required by the situation, and should be able to fire toward the land side as a part of their own defense. Railroad tracks, gasoline trucks, can be used here as well as anywhere. Military coast railroads on which such artillery and its supporting troops could be moved would be of value far beyond fixed forts, which can be avoided by the enemy. The uses of the artillery, both coast and field, from a vocational training point of view, should be developed. There is hardly any occupation of electric or mechanical nature in which these branches of the service do not give a valuable training, valuable in civil life. Such training could be made a powerful factor in seeking enrollments for these arms, and others that give similarly valuable training in any rational scheme for military preparedness. These changes will change all the drill books, change the minor tactics, change the administrative routine in some respects. So much is apparent to all thinking men; but it would need the genius of Napoleon to develop all these changes from the brain of one man—and also as many secretaries as Napoleon had.

What is far better, far more important, for our service, is to establish *a system by which changes are bound to come in an orderly manner as rapidly as they can surely be made.* In devising such a system it is far better to utilize what we have, than to abandon it. In many cases only slight modifications of existing things will be necessary; in all cases better and quicker results can be had by utilizing what we have than by trying to create a new military machine. We should create new machinery only where the present organization cannot be used economically for our purpose.

*Field Service
Regulations*

The Field Service Regulations prescribe the best organization for Permanent Personnel, on a war basis, that our military experts have been able to devise, in the light of all our experience and knowledge of the military art. In many respects they are far ahead of the statutory provisions, and they can be changed by an Executive Order, which cannot be done with statutory requirements. It is therefore considered that the Field Service Regulations should be adopted as the basis for the organization of the Permanent Personnel, except in the item of machine guns, subject to adequate provisions for elasticity of system to be hereafter explained. This covers the oversea defense and the Expeditionary Force, a total of three divisions.

Permanent Personnel of Training School But there is another element of the Permanent Personnel that is not covered by the Field Service Regulations, and is so intimately related to the Transient Personnel, that its organization must be considered in connection with that element of the National Defense. This is the 84 regiments, or equivalent bodies of troops, that will be devoted to the training of the Transient Personnel. The organization of this body will constitute the "Training School for Minute Men," and in its organization will be considered the necessary provisions for continental coast defense, not heretofore mentioned in this discussion. In order, therefore, to devise a suitable organization for this part of the Permanent Personnel, we must consider two other things; the continental coast defense, and the distribution of the Transient Personnel to the different elements of the service.

Continental Coast Defense Plans Continental coast defense is worthy of some discussion. It immobilizes a considerable number of men, and a very large amount of money; how much, may be conjectured from the statement that over a million dollars has been spent at the one place of Corregidor Island on insulated electric wire, alone. If the pretensions of the extremists of that branch were taken at face value the whole income of the United States Government could be spent on

coast defense alone, and all promotion in the whole army would be given to coast artillery officers; a branch of the service that has never fired a hostile shot in action, and when taken alone is absolutely helpless against attack from the rear.

Back in the administration of President Cleveland, a very distinguished Board, composed of high officers and influential politicians, headed by Secretary Endicott, elaborated an extensive scheme of coast defense, which has been gradually carried into effect by Congress. The subject has been treated by subsequent Boards, as new territory has been added to our country, until it has reached elaborate proportions indeed.

The principal justification for the extreme immobilization of men and money required by this scheme is that the non-military population of the seaboard cities fall into hysterical panic at the suggestion of war, and that this elaborate plan is necessary in order to protect them from the consequences of their own fears, which would follow an invasion in the shape of financial panic. It seems to be overlooked that these fortifications invite attack, cancel the immunity of unfortified places which is the best protection of these places from destruction, and that they are utterly defenseless except from direct, frontal attack from the sea. Any enemy might land at a distance of a single march, a few miles up or down the coast, and could take them in the

rear, where they are utterly undefended, and cannot be defended except by a mobile army. No coast defense of the United States has ever fired a hostile shot except Forts Moultrie and Sumpter, the latter against an attack from the land side by our own people, illustrating the helplessness of all such "Forts" when so attacked on the land side. Neither was effective for the purpose for which designed. Except in case of an invasion there is no human probability that a shot will ever be fired from one of them in hostility; and in that case the enemy will be composed of well trained men, who will certainly not sacrifice themselves by direct, frontal attack, when a short march will accomplish their purpose without loss.

Minimize the Conceding that a certain number
Immobilization of of important positions should be
Men and Money fortified, it may still be logically
 held that these positions should
be selected for military reasons, rather than for political considerations, and that every man and every dollar that is unnecessarily immobilized is a detriment to the National Defense. The present estimates call for about 18,000 men for one relief in the coast defenses. Three full reliefs are indispensable to successful resistance to even a frontal attack for any period longer than a couple of days. This estimate is for permanent, fixed ordnance, and not for the infantry defense of the rear, which must

be organized in addition to the personnel just mentioned.

One Relief of Permanent Personnel Thus the equivalent of a dozen regiments must be at once taken out of the 84 regiments for Training School work for this one relief of the sea coast fortifications of continental United States. The conditions of that service require a considerable proportion of expert men of special qualifications, whose instruction will afford opportunity for such vocational training of Minute Men; but it is believed, if the Permanent Personnel of the Coast Defense comprises one complete relief, and if this relief is used as instructors for the other two reliefs, composed of Transient Personnel or Minute Men, the legitimate requirements of coast defense can be adequately met.

Districting of Tributary Population Each fortification has its own peculiar conditions, and it is desirable to maintain a certain amount of secrecy in regard to the organization and equipment of these places. The best way to do this will be to draw the Transient Personnel needed, all the Minute Men that will be required, for any particular fortification, from a territorial district adjacent to it, where they can be kept in closer touch with their war duties than other Minute Men. This indicates the designation of a district of suitable population for each coast defense fortification, from

which shall be taken the Minute Men necessary for that fortification, and this district should be exempt from other military demands upon its inhabitants. Preferably this district will be territory served by the fortification in question, and thus there will be an element of self interest on the part of the people of this district in making its personnel effective.

Land Defense But this provision, alone, is not a complete coast defense. Unless the
also Necessary fortifications are also protected by an adequate mobile force on the land side, it is a waste of money to spend a dollar on them.

As an example, the case of Portland, Maine, may be cited. In 1902, I proposed a joint maneuver of the army and the navy at that point, with a view to fixing attention upon the landward side of the problem, and submitted a discussion of that phase of coast defense through military channels. The result was a decision to hold the proposed joint maneuver in 1903, the first time such a joint maneuver of the army and navy was ever held in this country. As the only available officer of the mobile army, I was requested to submit a scheme for the mobile element, of the land defense of this maneuver, and therefore made a very careful study of that terrain.

It was thought, after riding all over the ground, after taking into consideration all the probable landing places of the enemy, after careful consideration of all the known factors of the problem to the best

of my ability, that not less than 36,800 mobile troops would be necessary to resist with any prospect of success a well directed attack upon this harbor. The available mobile troops were then utilized in the plan submitted to outline the advanced elements of this mobile force in the proposed maneuvers, which were held on that basis. The details matter little in this discussion; the significant thing is that practically two complete divisions of mobile troops would be required for the landward defense of this port, alone; and that these conditions are typical of the conditions at all the other coast defense fortifications.

Mobile Forces for Land Defense The mobile troops assigned to this duty in each case will have a special problem, and may require special training. For example, the conditions at Corregidor are peculiar to that place. It is a small island, dominated within easy artillery range by a mountain accessible to the enemy, but an island that can be rendered virtually impregnable within its own defenses by infantry properly trained in the special lines necessary for that particular situation. It can therefore hold out against all enemies except lack of food, water and munitions, for an indefinite period, if such infantry be assigned and specially trained for its duties. The mobile defense on the mainland, while essential to the defense of Manila from land and sea attack, is not in this case

essential to a prolonged defense of Manila's coast defense fortifications, which can be sustained for a long time after Manila falls from land attack, if properly prepared in advance, and if there is any reason for holding Corregidor after Manila falls into the possession of the enemy.

Special Conditions, Special Training These examples illustrate the necessity for special training for the infantry component, the mobile component, of the coast defense, and the numbers of mobile troops that may be called upon for that sort of service. Special requirements frequently call for special organization and special training. The mobile troops of the Minute Man class located in the territory adjacent to such fortifications should therefore be organized and trained with special reference to the conditions in their respective localities. The Minute Man component assigned to the coast defense fixed armament, especially, should be specially organized and trained in its particular duties. In cases, as at Corregidor, where the mobile troops also require special organization and training, this should be taken into account; but in the general case any well organized mobile force can be adapted to the landward defense of any fixed fortification more economically than a special body can be assigned and trained for the special purpose. It will be well to make the mobile contingent in every locality familiar with the special

requirements of that locality, and to assign it for duty in that locality in case the developments of the campaign result in military operations in that theater of war; but save in the one case of Corregidor it is thought that no special assignment of mobile troops to any particular coast fortification is necessary, and that the assignment of one complete relief of Permanent Personnel, equivalent to 12 regiments from the Training School component, will give to the coast defense an adequate working force. The assignment of this Permanent Personnel as instructors in the Training School for the Minute Men who will be required in their particular fortification is a satisfactory application of the Training School idea for this purpose; and the assignment of the available citizens of the adjacent territory to furnish the Minute Men, or Transient Personnel, will insure that the peace time garrisons can be raised to a war basis with the least possible delay; a war force specially interested in their assigned duty, and specially trained to perform it properly. This system would give adequate and efficient service for the fixed fortifications, without great increase, undue increase, disproportional increase, in the number of troops, either of Permanent Personnel or Transient Personnel, immobilized for that purpose. Each fixed fortification would have its due number of Permanent Personnel for one complete relief, and these men would be the

trainers and instructors of the Transient Personnel which would be assigned to the service of that fortification in time of war, men having local interest in its service in addition to their general patriotic interest in their country's defense. The mobile elements would all receive a general training that would fit them for service anywhere, and they would not be immobilized, unless the attack fell upon their particular locality. In that case, of course, the mobile component, trained in that locality, would have a peculiar value for service in its own environment.

We therefore assign the equivalent of 12 regiments for Permanent Personnel of Sea Coast Fortifications, with the additional duty of training the transient personnel that will be assigned for the same duty.

Auxiliary Services Before an intelligent discussion of the problem of organizing the training school can be made, it is also necessary to consider certain other features, and to determine what proportion of the permanent personnel of the training school shall be assigned to the auxiliary services. Aviators who can really fly, as well as draw "flying pay"; Signalmen; Sanitary service; Quartermaster Corps; Engineers, and all the auxiliary elements that do not find a suitable place within the organization of the four principal arms, infantry, machine guns, mobile artillery and cavalry, must be taken into account in organizing the training school. Spe-

cial instruction, special organization, are necessary to the highest degree of efficiency in these units. These requirements can be better met if specially selected men are assigned to them. Not every man can become a wireless operator or an aviator; not every man possesses the mechanical ability to operate automobile transportation, or the business ability to become an efficient member of the Quartermaster's Corps. A way must be provided to put the round pegs in the round holes, if we would attain the maximum possibilities of any system. This must be done, too, without robbing the fighting line of its best men. A way can be found.

*Administrative
Organization*

Thus far we have dealt with tactical organization, with instruction of individuals, and methods of organization to promote individual instruction. But we must also consider the larger phases of organization and administration, the training of grouped tactical units in coöperation, in team play, if we wish to design a satisfactory system of organization. This part of military organization has never been completed in our country in time of peace. In time of war it has always been absolutely haphazard, never based upon any preconceived plan arranged for in time of peace. Neither General Carter's plan published in *The American Army*, nor "the plan" for a "Continental" army, offers any attempt to provide for this part of organization. Both leave us floundering

along with individual tactical units until the very beginning of War, then to bring together for the first time for the defense of some American Louvain the elements which must be articulated to form an army. This omission would be enough to condemn any plan.

Administrative Organization: Just as the basic unit for individual training is the company, that for minor tactics is the battalion, and *The Basic Unit* that for detailed administration is normally the regiment, so there is a basic unit for grand tactics, the method of using combined elements in war, for superior administration, for the activities of general officers who should think in big numbers rather than in terms of individual units. That unit is the Division.

This is the military unit of smallest size that is complete within itself for campaign operations. It is the first unit as we progress in combining elements that contains in due proportion all the components of the service necessary to military operations. In this unit is a complete miniature army, with full administrative authority; infantry, machine guns, mobile artillery, cavalry, sanitary service, signal service, engineer element and supply service, all complete.

In command of this unit we find for the first time adequate rank and proven capacity (or should find it) for big military problems, in a Major General.

This unit, therefore, is the fundamental basis for the organization of the training school.

This unit is likewise the logical basis for the territorial divisions into which the training school will necessarily be divided, and which will correspond to the tactical divisions of the training school. Each territorial division will contain a tactical division. It will be commanded by a Major General, and divided into three brigade districts for the infantry brigades of the division, while the other troops, the auxiliary troops, will be raised at large within the territorial limits of the division. Each of these brigade districts will expand automatically into a division in time of war, and will receive its due share of special troops from the central training school for that auxiliary, according to the assignment of the division to duty, and as the army commander (in time of peace the Major General of the original division) may determine.

Each division will have a central training school for its auxiliary parts, not necessarily all located at the same place; and these, as well as the training schools for the infantry, will be under the Major General Commanding the division. Each brigade commander will automatically become a division commander of an expanded brigade, expanded into a division of infantry by the assignment to duty of its Minute Men the instant the war becomes imminent. Each expanded brigade, or war division, will

be completed by the assignment of its proper share of auxiliaries by the commanding general. The whole army will come automatically into existence by proclamation of the President, whenever Congress may so authorize. The War Department will have nothing to do whatever with the details of this organization or its expansion to a war basis, and, thus relieved of a mass of detail that should never be attended to in any war department, its chiefs will have time for the larger questions of strategy and war policy that should be determined in the war office instead of in the newspaper offices. Let us decentralize.

*Detailed
Estimates
for the
Component
Elements*

We have already allotted the equivalent of 12 regiments of the training school components to the coast defense of continental United States. We are now to determine how many more should be assigned for special purposes and how many divisions can be organized in the training school. We can not do better in this allotment than to be guided by experience, stipulating for sufficient flexibility of organization for subsequent improvements. The question of flexibility of organization is to be discussed in a later chapter, and need not enter into the summary of present experience. The summarized experience of all the military men of all time, brought down to date as nearly as I am able to do it, indicates the following

ratios of component parts of an army division, in terms of regimental units or fractional parts thereof.

Infantry	9.
Cavalry	3.
Mobile Artillery	3.
Separate Machine Gun Corps33 $\frac{1}{3}$
Engineers66 $\frac{2}{3}$
Signalmen66
Sanitary50
Quartermaster Corps50
Administrative personnel33 $\frac{1}{2}$

Total parts 18.

We have estimated for the equivalent of 84 regiments, of which we have set aside 12 regiments for coast defense. This leaves the equivalent of 72 regiments to be divided among the foregoing elements in the ratios above indicated to form the permanent personnel of the Training School for Minute Men.

CHAPTER IX.

ORGANIZATION, CONTINUED.

Four Divisions in Training School As we have 72 regiments disposable, this number gives just four divisions for the training school.

The tactical and the territorial division will be combined for simplicity. Continental United States will, therefore, be divided into four territorial divisions, and one tactical division of the training school will be assigned to each territorial division. Each territorial division will have one complete tactical division of the training school, with all of the Permanent Personnel of the training school that belongs to that work. Each of these divisions will maintain a complete training school system for Minute Men. Each will provide for the mobilization of its own entire personnel. Each will attend to all the details of organization, both in peace and in war, for all the forces assigned to or trained within it. Each will be complete within itself. Each division will be commanded by a Major General, who will have all the subordinate commanders and staff necessary for his work. He will have an adequate permanent personnel for the training of the Minute Men to be raised in his division and instructed by it; and he will be charged with the duty

of preparing it for war and commanding it when it is called for service in war.

Coast Defense The organization of the coast defense transient personnel centers in each coast defense district about the Permanent Personnel, which will be located in the permanent, fixed fortifications of that district. At these points the Minute Men of that coast defense district report for their year of training; to the same points they report at once when the President issues his proclamation that a public emergency exists that requires the mobilization of the trained Minute Men of the nation. They will serve the same guns at which they were trained, and will be commanded by the same officers who trained them.

Organization of Divisions In each territorial division will be an administrative center at which will be established the instructional facilities for the special auxiliaries of that division, and to which will report those members of the transient personnel selected for assignment to these auxiliary services, such as sanitary personnel, signalmen, and other elements enumerated above of minor numerical importance, but of a tactical importance far beyond their numerical index. Here also will be the administrative center of the tactical division, charged with the training of all the men in the division, with their enrollment, their mobilization, the supervision of their supply and equipment,

their assignments to organizations for war service, and their demobilization at the end of their service.

Subdivisions Such a division will naturally be too large to handle without subdivisions.

The military organization of the division into brigades is happily adapted to such subdivisions; the logical scheme of expansion for war service will fit equally well into a rational scheme of subdivision. The special units will be provided for at the central place of administration, though the actual training schools for these units may be located at the most convenient point. The division, therefore, can be logically divided into three districts, each of which will have the personnel of one training school brigade, and all the Minute Men that will be trained by that personnel. Each of these will be under the command of a brigadier general, charged with the supervision of its operations in time of peace, with the mobilization of its entire trained force for war, and with the command of that force in the campaign that will follow its mobilization. The Permanent Personnel will be charged with the instruction of the Minute Men, with their enrollment, their assignment, and their transfers as occasion may require. Each district will be a complete unit within itself as far as the infantry service is concerned, and will furnish the infantry organization for one complete division in case of war. The records of instruction, assignment and transfers,

for the special, auxiliary arms, would be kept at the Division Headquarters, at which the enrolled men would be received on enrollment cards from the district headquarters at the beginning of the school year. The special arms would thus be relieved entirely of the labor of enrollment, in view of the extra labor which they will have to properly instruct their men within the time assigned for the purpose; but they will keep all records pertaining to their own men after their enrollment.

Machine Gun Component The proper proportion of this element is one battalion to each brigade, the battalion being three companies of three platoons each, the whole working under the orders of the brigade commander. There must also be an adequate reserve in addition to the foregoing organization. The estimates for the infantry regiments above given include one company of machine guns to each regiment, as now provided in the Field Service Regulations of our army. In addition the proportional parts indicated also provide for $33\frac{1}{3}\%$ of a regiment in numbers to each division as a separate machine gun corps. When the Field Service Regulations shall be amended in this particular so as to separate the machine gun service from infantry and cavalry these estimates will give, when combined in a separate corps, the proper pro rata allowance of machine guns in the division.

This machine gun organization will be susceptible of expansion in just the same way as any other part of the system. It will constitute one of the special units of auxiliary troops to be handled at division headquarters in time of peace, and will be treated as a separate corps in the rest of this discussion.

Training Infantry is the basis of all armies. It
School will be the basis of this training school.
Infantry The territorial division of the country
will be based on the tactical divisions of the infantry, after setting aside the necessary districts for coast defense. The whole country (less artillery coast defense districts) will be divided into four divisions. Each of these divisions will be subdivided into three districts, and the districts may be subdivided into subdistricts for the regimental training schools, local branches of the great national training school. To each territorial division will be assigned one tactical division of the permanent Personnel of the Training School, on a training school basis as to organization and numbers. To each district will be assigned one brigade of this tactical division, and to each subdistrict one regiment. Each of these regiments will constitute a local or regimental branch of the national training school, for the purpose of enrolling, training, equipping, assigning, mobilizing on call and demobiliz-

ing at expiration of the emergency, the transient personnel, or Minute Men of its subdistrict.

The special training school branches required in the division for training the personnel of the auxiliary services will be located at the most convenient points within the district for the purpose. They may be managed as one training school branch in each division for each special arm, or may be divided into three brigade branches, as a matter of convenience, to be determined by the circumstances. In general it will be better to make one such branch in each division than to split these special schools up into brigade branches. The proper quota of Minute Men students will be supplied for each of them from the regimental subdistricts; and since the only object is to so assign men as to produce the best results it will be possible to send to these special schools men who desire as much vocational training in their military course as possible.

*Training School
Organization,
Interior*

Each company of this training school will consist of three commissioned officers and 25 picked soldiers as permanent personnel, organized into battalions, regiments and brigades and divisions as now prescribed, or may be hereafter prescribed in the Field Service Regulations. An element of flexibility is to be introduced into the organization in this way, to be explained more fully in the next chapter. At the most con-

venient date in each year each company will receive 125 members of the Transient Personnel for a period of one year, to be trained as highly as possible in that time. These trained men will then store their fitted equipments and take the status of furlough for 3 years as Minute Men, subject to call when so authorized by Congress.

Details of Training The details of this course of training will vary, no doubt, in different arms of the service and in one year, more or less, from that given in preceding years. There is no occasion in this discussion to write schedules of training. It is enough to indicate, for example, that a certain period will be devoted to enrollment and organization; then a period of theoretical instruction, as at West Point; then one, possibly a month, devoted to practical work, during which designated elements of the furloughed Minute Men may be called out for a brief review of their previous training, and to become acquainted with the new personnel; a suitable period would follow for completing the year's work by issuing furloughs to the new Minute Men who had just completed their year of training, discharging those who had completed their three years of special liability, disbanding the transient personnel, storing equipment, and assigning the recently furloughed men to their proper places in the expanded organization; and,

last, a period of rest and relaxation during which the permanent personnel of the training school would enjoy a vacation analogous to that of colleges in lieu of the usual leaves of absence now given to officers.

*The Year Cycle;
Flexibility of
Program*

This cycle will constitute the ordinary year's work for the training school for Minute Men. The same phase of the cycle need not necessarily be in progress at the same time in all the divisions, or even in all the districts of a division. That is a matter to be regulated according to the climatic and industrial conditions in each district, and this flexibility will be used to obtain the best results in each district. The month or so, for example, for practical training would be assigned just before the period of demobilization and should fall in that time of year that will permit the maximum out-of-door work at the minimum inconvenience industrially to the furloughed classes. This would cause the cycle to begin at different times of the year in different districts, a matter of consequence only as a matter of convenience, since each district can be made practically independent of all the others in the arrangement of its schedules of instruction.

Enrollment

Two of these periods will be specially important. These are the enrollment and the demobilization periods.

Since we have reasserted the doctrine of obligatory military service, it becomes necessary to make and keep an enrollment of all male citizens of military age. This will be one of the most tedious and laborious of all the preliminary jobs by which the system will be installed. The census tables, the grand jury lists of judicial districts, even the party lists of county committees, and especially the lists that can be furnished by postmasters, will give the preliminary data for this work. Dividing the whole country into divisions, and these into districts and subdistricts, with reference to population and transportation facilities, will be the first step in this work. Then will come the assignment of the proper quotas of the Permanent Personnel to their respective districts; but before this can be done it will be necessary to reorganize the regular army upon the new basis.

Voluntary Deferring discussion of army re-
Enrollments organization and assuming that
 distribution has been made of the
Permanent Personnel of the training school, then will come the call for voluntary enrollments in the training school. This must be made in a campaign of publicity in order to familiarize the American people with the idea. The officers and men of the training school must be used to make practically a personal canvass of their territory, explaining to everybody just what the

new training school is, what it will teach, how it will proceed, and what liability to military service will be incurred by voluntary enrollment, what advantages will follow voluntary enrollment, and what disadvantages will result from drafted service. A strong appeal to the latent patriotism of the people must be made. The high standards of the regular service must be exhibited to the people by the conduct of these officers and men, and every possible appeal made to the public intelligence in order that its citizens shall loyally support the only system that can ever enable the country to defend itself. Right along with this canvassing campaign can be conducted the first enumeration of all those liable to military service.

*Drafted**Minute Men*

At a fixed date it would be necessary to close this canvassing campaign. The number of voluntary enrollments for the first class would then be known, there would be a list of all citizens liable to military service who had not volunteered, and it would be possible to select from this list those who must be drafted to complete the first annual class. There are many ways in which this draft could be made. All of a certain age might be taken, enough to insure complete classes with a surplus; then exemptions could be made from this list to reduce it; and out of the remainder the necessary number could be chosen by lot. Other and

better plans may be suggested; but there would be no difficulty in devising a plan that would insure the completion of the annual class. This is a question of the ability of the nation to live; a question where the inclinations of the individual, and his private interests, must give way for the general good of the whole country. The nation has a right to the services of her citizens in war; and it has an equal right to require them to take the necessary personal training to make their services efficient. The required training cannot be given in time of war without paying a frightful penalty for unpreparedness, and possibly meeting national disaster as a result of it. Therefore, the rights, if they have any rights, of the few must give way in order that the rights (as they surely have) of the many may be served.

With the annual class thus completed, the training school would proceed to the execution of its instructional program; and from that time all its operations would proceed upon well ordered lines of activity.

Card Indexes In the course of this preliminary enumeration of those liable to military service it would be expedient to create a card index covering the whole population of each district, at least the whole military population. The creation of this card index would require the assignment of certain members of the permanent personnel

to this particular duty. Possibly it might be that the Census Bureau could be usefully employed on this duty in connection with the training school, to avoid duplication of labor by the Federal Government; but if not, the military personnel could keep its own records. Provision should be made so that the card of any person could be forwarded from one district to another upon change of residence, so that no man could evade his military duty by mere change of residence. This is the weakest element in any militia system; for if Private John Smith, of the militia of Ohio, sees fit to remove his residence to Indiana, there is no federal law by which Smith can be held to his military obligation in Ohio, and no mere state law can cover the case. As a matter of fact this defect of our militia system is frequently resorted to by men who wish to drop their duty as members of the militia.

These card index records and their permanent clerks would become the key to the whole system of National Defense; and if, at a later date, the number of voluntary enrollments should be inadequate, this office force would be charged with the duty of drawing the additional number of cards required to complete the annual training school class, and with notifying the selected men when and where to report for duty.

Exemptions Of course there would be certain exemptions by law. All countries have that feature. Such a feature is properly based upon

the fact that the exempted person is rendering equivalent necessary service to the nation that must go on in time of war, or has some disability that would prevent him from rendering effective military service. The only support of a family; the student who is pursuing an equivalent course of instruction in a military or professional school, the profession being one useful to the national defense; the cripple; the member of the militia actually enrolled and performing his militia duty according to law; these would be exempt from draft. The exemption of militiamen from draft would at once fill up the ranks of that organization with competent men and put new life into the organized militia. The passage of a suitable pay bill for the militia, by which the Federal Government would give to that body of patriotic men reasonable recognition for their valuable and patriotic services, would complete a chain of help for the militia which would make it a really effective body in the National Defense, to be used, as it was properly used in the beginning of the government, for local defense for emergencies, and for the three purposes mentioned in the constitution of the United States. There are many able-bodied citizens who would gladly serve in the militia, under the constitutional restrictions, who could not and would not willingly undertake the wider liability of oversea or expeditionary service; service which might be required for the offensive defense of the

country in time of war, the "carrying of the war into Africa" which is sometimes the best possible defense, but which might be incompatible with their personal necessities, and yet perfectly compatible with local service, a necessary service which must be rendered in order to permit other bodies of troops to make the offensive return which may decide the war.

Possibly the Civil War expedient of hiring a substitute might be permitted under some restriction. Provided the substitute be an acceptable man, and the exempt be a useful citizen in some other direction, there might be sound reasons why such substitution could be permitted in many cases. The system should be flexible in such particulars. Regulations would be prescribed to govern this subject, and would be amended from time to time; but the institution of a card index enumeration would be the first preliminary work of the training school personnel, the basis of all this application of the law, and its maintenance up to date from year to year would be an important routine duty. Whatever might be the regulations as to exemptions, the drawings should be absolutely impartial, and the exemptions should be impartially accorded to all citizens. I am aware that this proposition is likely to be the stumbling block in the adoption of this plan for the National Defense; but no plan can be effective that does not make sure provision for the annual classes. There must reside in the

Federal Government the right and the power, as there does reside in it the undoubted duty, to provide adequately for the National Defense. It is a matter of self preservation, of self defense, that we are considering. The very ability of the nation to live is at stake in this thing. Nothing less than the above provisions will be effective; therefore, since these are the irreducible minimum conditions of national self defense, they must be complied with by the Congress and the American People.

Issue of Equipments Immediately upon the arrival of the annual class at the designated rendezvous would come their assignment to duty and the issue to them, as soon as they could be made ready to care for it, of their arms and equipment. First would be the selection and assignment of the quotas necessary for the special arms, to be sent to the division schools for these auxiliaries, and there to be at once entered upon the proper course of training for their special services. The issue of equipments would be a permanent issue, to be kept for the same man during the whole period of his military service. This would eliminate one of the most tedious delays met with heretofore in the organization of volunteers. The soldier would retain and use this equipment during his whole year at the training school, and it would then be stored, properly tagged with his name, at the rendezvous, ready for immediate use by him

CHAPTER X.

General Considerations In the military art, as in all other arts, tools and equipments are being constantly improved, new tools are being designed, and new applications of old ideas constantly made. It is therefore an error to fix our organizations by statutory requirements and limitations so they cannot be changed to meet the new conditions. This is one of the most serious errors that has handicapped the development of the National Defense in our country; that and the lack of adequate sanction for experimental work.

Illustration of the Defect As an illustration of how this rigidity of system works, take the effort to develop the machine gun service, with which I am familiar.

In 1897, the project of organizing a machine gun service was reduced to proper form, and submitted to the Commandant of the Ft. Leavenworth School (General Hamilton S. Hawkins), by whom every possible encouragement was given to continue the special studies along that line. He submitted the plans to the Faculty, by which these plans were favorably considered and he forwarded the plans to the War Department with a favorable endorsement, recommending that they be developed. Nothing came of it. There was no statutory sanc-

tion for any such experiment, or for the necessary organization.

The War with Spain came on. Even then there was no sanction for a new thing that had been favorably considered by the ablest body of tactical experts then in our service. Application after application to move along that line was turned down, and the applicant was made to feel severely that he was in strong disfavor, by reason of his activity along a line that did not meet with the favor of those in authority. The preliminary steps for an organization had to be covered under the pretext of a detail for duty at the Ordnance Depot, by which means a dozen men were got together who were willing to learn how to use a machine gun as an extra piece of work in addition to strenuous duty.

The time came for the expedition to Santiago to embark. This unofficial organization was omitted from the orders for embarkation, was left stranded as a depot guard, and had to be smuggled aboard ship in the technical status of "absent without leave" from their assigned station and duty at the depot, a status that ten days would convert into the more serious status of "Desertion in time of war." These men accepted this risk, just as they afterward accepted the chances of battle, in order to render a service unprecedented in warfare, the demonstration to superiors who were unwilling to see it of a new arm of the service, a new weapon in offensive warfare.

Without a chance to fire a single shot in target practice, they broke the back of Spanish resistance at the critical moment when victory or defeat depended upon their efforts. They created a new epoch in warfare that is now recognized on all the battle lines in Europe, and outlined a correct system of organization for a new arm of the service that has just received the absolute recognition of England after a year of experience with all sorts of substitutes for the correct thing.

But they did all this without recognition, without orders, in the face of jeers and official opposition of the most galling kind, at the risk of being classed as "Deserters" in the face of the enemy.

A Hidebound System It should not be necessary for any new thing to fight its way under such difficulties in any sound organization.

But there is worse to tell. For 17 years since that time it has been the same uphill work to secure any sort of organization for the machine gun service, some sort of legal status for it, and still the fight is unsuccessful. In 1905, after substantially every other great nation in the world had adopted some sort of machine gun organization, one was proposed for the United States, only to be met with the objection that the organization of our army is prescribed by statute, and that no legal sanction for any such organization was in existence. This objection, of course, was raised by officials who did

not want to see any such organization, either because they were professionally so far behind the times that they did not see the necessity, or else because they did not want to be bothered with the work of organizing a new thing.

After months of study to find a way around this technical objection, a way was found to accomplish something, a very unsatisfactory thing, but still something, under cover of legal sanction, that was never intended by the statesmen who enacted the law.

A plan was drafted in 1906, and submitted to President Roosevelt, proposing that he cause the necessary guns to be bought as "equipment" of infantry and cavalry which is not prescribed by Act of Congress; and that he then order the necessary number of infantrymen and cavalymen detailed to work these guns, under his general authority. The organizations thus formed had to be designated as "provisional." It was found that this could be done without such a transgression of the law as would entail the impeachment of the President by a hostile Congress. It so happened that Colonel Roosevelt believed in the proposed use of such guns, because he had personal knowledge of their use at Santiago, and that on this one occasion he followed his personal views, in spite of all opposition, being absolutely sure that even in this objectionable form the provisional organization would give a good ac-

count of itself in action. Thus a system of "provisional" platoons was established in 1906, but absolutely without legal status.

As expected, the evils of this imperfect system of organization led to so much protest that by 1908, it was necessary to make some new move to save the situation; so a "provisional" company was proposed for experimental work, under the same color of legal sanction. Again receiving the aid of President Roosevelt, based as before on his personal knowledge of the fighting value of such an organization, it was found possible to crystallize public sentiment in favor of the retention of the provisional platoon organization, in spite of its obvious defects, in order that our army might not be totally deficient in this element of the service.

Similar conditions are met with in other departments of the service.

All officers who exhibit originality and enterprise have similar experiences. It is on a par with the custom of department clerks to make it hot for any clerk who works overtime, or works more efficiently than themselves, "make it hot" for him, because his example may mean increased work and higher standards for them.

A fundamental defect of our system is indicated. Instead of penalizing originality, progressiveness, and "Vision," there should be means provided in our system by which these qualities would be en-

couraged and rewarded by suitable recognition. A way is proposed in this discussion, by which this can be done without detriment to the interests or promotion of others.

Necessity for Flexibility of Organization If the stress laid on this point seems to be out of place and unreasonable, remember that on this point hangs the whole question of adequate preparation for National Defense. Unless we make suitable provision for experimental work, and for the adoption and application of its results when demonstrated to be sound, with adequate recognition for those who do such work, however well we may prepare on the basis of our present knowledge of the military art, we shall be just as badly outstripped in a few years in some new direction as we have been distanced in the last few years in the machine gun service and in the aero service. Both of these originated in our own country, and both have been brought to a high state of perfection in Europe, while we have stood still on account of the absolute unadaptability of our military system to utilize new devices or new methods.

The Vital Thing The thing above all other things vital, supremely important, is that we should have a system by which we can utilize the fruits of our own ingenuity and keep other countries from stealing our ideas and inventions. There is no desire here to censure any individual,

but to call attention to a condition; to focus attention upon a grave defect of system, in the hope of bringing about improvement, bringing about the adoption of a system whereby improvements in the military art, originating with Americans, can be utilized by some means less cumbersome than the education of the non-military American Public into an overwhelming political demand for action by Congress. That method is too slow, too public, and insures that the other fellow will "beat us to it" every time.

If we were to accept the schedule of organizations above indicated as correct, without some provision that would permit of readjustment as the art of war is developed, and were to enact this scheme into statute by Act of Congress, parts of this legislation would begin to be obsolete before the statute could be printed. No matter what form of organization be adopted now, if we incorporate in the statute a reasonable provision for flexibility of organization, for elasticity to meet and adopt and to develop improvements, then this system can be brought up to date and kept up to date. Such a provision is far more important than the form of organization that may exist, or may be adopted at any given time.

Of course the reply is that provision already exists through the Board of Ordnance and Fortification, the Ordnance Department and the Quarter-

master Department, for such developments. But the fact remains that in spite of all these channels, and in spite of all these explanations, the present means are not effective. So long as those who labor to devise new things only succeed in preparing our possible enemies to use them, as has been the case in the machine gun service and in the aero service, so long as their ideas, like the social elect of the "400," must have the stamp "Approved in Germany" or "Approved Abroad" upon them in order to be recognized and adopted in our own country, so long as there is even a general impression (which there is without a doubt) that no idea stands a chance of adoption unless it originates in the department concerned, that long our system is fatally defective.

There must be some sort of a board of review for such things that can take them out of the hands of the interested departments, in which the officials are only too apt to feel that any suggestion for improvement that does not originate with them is a reflection upon themselves, not to be tolerated for a moment. That is the kernel of the nut, say what you will; and the decision in all such matters must be made by disinterested experts who are above such petty considerations.

Possibly Secretary Daniels may have rendered a very great service to the country by the organization of his Board of Advisory Technical Experts.

The mere existence of such a board will tend to secure a fair hearing for new ideas such as they have never had in the past. But this advisory Board of Experts is not a complete solution. The President should have statutory power to regulate the matter, and to reserve for the exclusive use of the United States all valuable products of American Genius that can be utilized in its defense. This cannot be justly done without adequate power to suitably reward the inventors or discoverers of such devices or ideas. There is no sound reason why officers of the army and navy should be exempt from the benefits of such a law. The products of inventive genius or original research are above and outside of routine duty. That is the very theory on which patents and copyrights are based. The reward for them should be above and beyond the regular stipend paid for routine service. The government might exercise a right analogous to that of "Eminent Domain" in such cases, but that right is not invoked without suitable appraisalment and reimbursement.

Great stress has been laid upon this point, because it is thought to be the supreme defect of our system, or lack of system. With adequate provisions to correct this defect all other needed improvements will follow as a matter of course, provided we do not tie up the new organization by statutory enactments as to details, but leave it free to adopt and

utilize the products of American Genius. Without correction of this vital defect, we can never have a system of National Defense that will be up to date. Republican institutions do not lend themselves readily to prompt adoption of improvements. They are really more conservative than autocratic governments in such matters. An edict from the Mikado, adopted our machine gun system in July, 1908, before the report on the original Machine Gun Company could be completed. A Ukase from the Czar makes a national change in habits overnight. A military order from the Kaiser is sufficient to develop aero and submarine service as quickly as human ingenuity and German thoroughness can do it. But in our country, under present conditions, specific authority from Congress is necessary for the change of the most insignificant detail of military organization. Each department of the military service is pulling with all its might for what it can get for its own little interest, and this is accentuated by a wretched system of promotion which fixes the whole personal interest of each officer upon the augmentation of his own little special branch of the service. The Member of Congress who seeks for military advice from two different departments, is sure to hear two different sets of arguments, each hostile to the other, both from public and selfish interest; and if he extends his inquiries to other departments his activity will develop just as many

lines of special pleading as he enters different departments. The creation of a great popular demand for specific legislation, is always very difficult.

Proposed Law on this Subject. Be it enacted, etc.

1. The President shall have power to prescribe all needful rules and regulations, from time to time, for the military forces of the United States, and to make such changes in organization as he may see fit; provided that the annual appropriations made by Congress shall not be exceeded as a result of any such change of regulations or of organization.

2. The President shall have power to consider and to test any new idea or invention, whether of equipment, ordnance, tactics or organization, under such regulations as he may prescribe from time to time. Provided, that if as a result, any such idea, device, equipment or other suggestion, be found to have a military value, the President shall have power to cause the same to be reserved for the exclusive use of the United States, and to determine in what manner and by what amount the author or inventor of such device, idea or suggestion, shall be rewarded by the United States.

Analogy, The contractor who built the Banker's
Continued mansion, used the very best and latest tools and materials. If he had not done so, the Supervising Architect would have protested.

The contractor also employed the most competent workmen he could find. Again, if he had not done so, the Supervising Architect would have protested to the Banker. On this protest the Banker would justly have cancelled the contract and employed another contractor. In using these materials and men, the contractor would have used the latest, best, and surest methods. Again, if he had not done so the Supervising Architect would have made a protest, and the methods would have been brought up to date or a new contractor employed.

Applications to this case Now, in this analogy Congress may represent the Banker, the President the Contractor, and the Secretary of War the Supervising Architect. Construction of the edifice of National Security from Predatory Attack—which no man since August 1914, may deny to be a danger that threatens our country—is surely worthy of at least as much care as the construction of a house for a private banker. In our analogy, we have strained nothing. Let us apply the deductions honestly, no matter where the shoe pinches. We must have an honest Contractor, who really intends to construct a satisfactory National Defense, and not to merely use that national necessity as a means to gain advantage in politics. We must have a competent Supervising Architect; competent from a military point of view, one who knows the business just as well as the Supervising Archi-

tect that the Banker would employ, not one who is merely a good lawyer or a good judge or an astute politician. For the sure elaboration of a sure National Defense, the country needs a Secretary of War who is *technically competent to supervise military work*, not merely an amiable man or one distinguished in some other profession.

It will also be necessary to provide for the best and latest equipment, not in a piecemeal, haphazard fashion, but as liberally as the work demands, and as fast as it can be used. When would that Banker's mansion have been built if the materials had been doled out scrap by scrap, with long intervals of delay before each issue; and how much would the cost be increased by such a method of supplying the material? The nation needs this edifice of security from predatory attack a good deal worse than the Banker's Family needed the new house. The Banker could rent a house, or buy one that would serve his necessities temporarily, or could go to a hotel. The nation cannot do any of the things that would correspond to these expedients, and just as surely as some nation or group of nations is going to come out of this European War with advantage, just that surely our country is going to be called upon to settle a big score of grievances and to defend the integrity of the Western Hemisphere which will be attacked under the pretext of Mexican intervention or adjustment of claims growing out

of the existing disorders in that country. Unless we supply all the necessary materials, employ the best talent we have on the job, and utilize the services of a technically capable man for Supervising Architect, we shall be absolutely at the mercy of any such aggression, and the bill will be many times over more than it would cost to make adequate preparation to meet the emergency, and make that preparation while there is yet time enough to do it. This provision must include adequate flexibility of organization and equipment, on the lines above indicated, to be successful.

Change of Equipment A little discussion will make this clearer to the non-military reader. Equipments vary from age to age. To the Greek phalanx, the 16-foot spear; to the Roman legion, the throwing javelin and the short sword; to the mailed Crusader, his armor, mace, battle axe, lance and the long sword; to Frederick's Grenadiers, the matchlock and the bayonet; to Napoleon, overwhelming artillery; to William of Prussia the needle gun; to his grandson, William of Germany, the machine gun, the taube, asphyxiating gas, submarines, 20-mile artillery, wireless communication, the motor transportation. The end of invention is not yet. Our own Edison has predicted that our next war will be one of machinery (in which he is wrong, for war is never a conflict of machinery, but of the skill that uses machinery); but we can foresee some of

the imminent changes now impending, and we can be sure that the future will bring as many as the past has brought.

*Changes
of Drill*

Changes of equipment bring changes of drill and instruction, for these are only a sort of training in the use of equipments combined with the discipline that results from proper subordination for organization. The infantryman learns at drill how to load and aim his rifle and use his bayonet; the artilleryman how to determine ranges and work his guns to make hits where the fire commander directs; and so on. Any change in the detail of equipment brings a corresponding change in the details of drill and instruction. The manual of arms with the present rifle is quite different from that with the Springfield forty-five of thirty years ago. The drill of the field artilleryman is vastly different now from what it was with the old brass, muzzle loading "Napoleon" of the Civil War.

*Changes of
Tactics*

Tactics, the art of managing combined elements of an army on the battlefield, also changes with equipment and with drill. The tactics of the phalanx failed before those of the legion. Those of the muzzle loader failed before those of the needle gun. Shock tactics for infantry virtually died at New Orleans when Pakenham's veterans went down to defeat before the sharpshooters of the backwoods.

Now that the machine gun has come to its own, new tactics must be devised to meet a new equipment. It has produced a deadlock along the whole Western Line in Europe, in spite of the aero service and the heavy artillery. Nothing but the use of machine guns on both sides prevents one or the other from breaking the line of the other side at some point.

Other Changes Other forms of equipment vary. The automobiles of Gallieni showed that a new system of transportation must be reckoned with in the future. The soup cart and the fireless cooker have made individual cooking out of date. The wireless combined with aero service has revolutionized the service of security and information. Prophylaxis has revolutionized the science of sanitation. No more does the surgeon regard gangrene as a necessary evil; no more high rate of mortality from typhoid and camp dysentery. The interior management of the hospital, corresponding to the "drill" of line troops, has undergone as great a change as its exterior service in relation to other parts of an army. The preventable diseases like typhoid and small pox, are treated at the recruiting office by prophylactic inoculation.

Dysentery and malaria are treated at the camp kitchen and cess pools. Instead of long wards full of patients the modern military surgeon is busy teaching men to filter their water, screen their food,

avoid mosquitos, and safeguard themselves from incapacitating consequences of other unavoidable diseases; how to establish and to maintain aseptic conditions in case of wound and injury.

Recentness of Improvements Many of these improvements are so recent that no provision has been made in our service for them. The combination of aero service with wireless communication has been made since August 1914, but has not reached us yet. The automatic rifle that works was invented by an American officer, but was rejected in our service. It was then accepted by Belgium, and demonstrated on the firing line. It is now being furnished to Belgium, France and England, from American factories, by American talent, but not to the United States Army. The immediate adoption of such a rifle for our infantry is indicated by the tactical developments of the last year, but we have not even begun to consider how such an automatic rifle should be organized, and a discussion of this topic is prohibited—as if discussion or nondiscussion would alter the facts. The ostrich hides its head in the sand.

Defect of System Now the point being made is not criticism of anybody, but that we are working under a defective system. The development of new equipment, new drill to go with it, new organization to satisfy the requirements of both, must not be checked by the incorrect judg-

ment of any one man or group of men. The establishment of a national system by which such improvements can be made in spite of such opponents is infinitely more important than any particular kind of equipment, drill, tactics or organization. The encouragement of our people, especially our permanent officers, to think in terms of the Monitor, the Cushing Torpedo, the aeroplane, the machine gun, the automatic rifle, wireless communication; in terms of progress, that is the important thing.

We must have a statute requiring that every new idea, every new invention, shall be submitted to practical tests by persons of adequate skill who have no ossification of initiative, no personal pique or interest, in order that their valuable features may be developed for the exclusive use of our own country. With such a law the separate machine gun service, long ago demonstrated as the only correct form of organization for that service, would have been adopted in our country years ago. Under such a law experiments would have been begun as soon as Browning invented the automatic pistol to apply this principle to the rifle and to determine what changes of organization are necessary in order to introduce such a rifle into the service. No sensible man has doubted that, sooner or later, the automatic principle must replace the less effective

weapon for rifles as well as pistols; but it took 15 years to get even the automatic pistol adopted.

An Application of the Proposed System In this case it is easy to see how such experiments could be conducted. A sufficient number of automatic rifles could be handed to one or more live-wire captains, with orders to work it out; find out just how many such rifles can be advantageously used in their companies; just what changes of equipment will be necessary; just what sort of drill regulations must be written in order to utilize it to the best advantage; just what changes in organization should be made in their companies. Then their report should be tested in the same way by the next higher unit, the battalion, and one or a dozen comparisons made by means of suitable tactical problems with the present rifle and system.

Such a series of tests would speedily settle all questions in regard to the matter, and under our proposed system there would be ample authority in the President to make the best idea effective for immediate application, within the current appropriations. If it were of sufficient importance to make such action desirable, he could apply to Congress for a special appropriation; but in any case there would be action, and the pitiful state of unpreparedness we now have could not be traced to any defect of the military system.

Precisely the same sort of logic applies to every military problem. It is only a matter of applying the rule of common sense, just as a business man uses common sense about his own affairs. It is quite possible that the best form for this idea to take might be a Bureau of Invention and Improvement, a technical bureau, furnished with adequate funds, authorized to use as many line troops as might be necessary for its experimental work, and having jurisdiction of all such matters. Such a bureau would have saved the Wright aeroplane ideas for our own use, instead of driving them abroad for recognition; would have perfected the Lewis Rifle, with its correct design for the dissipation of heat, instead of driving it to Belgium; would have arranged long ago for a separate machine gun organization; would now be considering the automatic rifle for infantry and the changes resulting from its adoption; would be working upon some practicable system of feeding our men; also some way to supply them with water; might have a dozen other valuable ideas before it that have never been presented because there is not at present any hope that any such idea can receive practical consideration.

To such a bureau the President might say: "It is clear that the Belgians have put one over on us in this matter of the Lewis Automatic Rifle. They have a good thing which we have not got. The Germans have a better way of feeding their men

than we have. The Japs have a better bayonet. The French have worked out a hand grenade that we have not got. The English are doing something new with wireless from aeroplanes to manage artillery fire. Take what mobile troops you need and in three months from now make me a full report on these subjects, with practical recommendations, estimates, and textbooks where such books are necessary."

Then this bureau would designate the man who was interested in this sort of work, a round peg for a round hole, and would say: "Here is the order of the President; here is your material or the money to get it; here are the troops you need for the work. Take these things and get out the report on this subject," and the work would be done.

That is the way to get such things done.

Then the President would avail himself of the proposed flexibility of system, and would direct that the approved results be put into effect as fast as appropriations might permit. There would be no nonsensical talk about securing the unanimous agreement of 3,000 scattered officers, most of them ignorant of the subject; the approved report of a bureau of disinterested experts would govern the matter, and at once.

It is not enough to have merely an "Advisory Board of Technical Experts." Such a body has no statutory authority, nor has the President any

statutory authority to utilize its services or its recommendations, if these entail any expense. It may go out of existence by the same whim that created it, or by the whim of some succeeding Secretary. The views of such a Board can never command the loyalty of bureaus composed of permanent officials, whose noses are necessarily more or less out of joint by the mere fact that such a board is in existence. Its mere existence is a reflection upon them and their departments. They only await the opportune moment to kill every suggestion of such a body, and just because they are permanent while it is transient, such an opportunity will be presented.

But with a permanent Bureau of Inventions and Improvement there would be an open forum for the discussion of all such questions: the duty would be assigned to those officers most attracted to that sort of work and therefore most competent to do that sort of work, and results would follow.

Of course, the opposing statement that we already have all the facilities for such work in existence in the various departments of the Army is foreseen. The one and unanswerable reply is: "It does not work out that way now. Our American ideas have to go abroad to get recognition under the present system. We want a system that will work for us; not one that drives our ideas abroad to the advantage of our rivals, our possible enemies."

CHAPTER XI.

COMMISSIONED PERSONNEL.

Defects of Present System One of the principal causes of the totally inadequate condition of the National Defense, our absurd lack of system, and of the extremely uneconomical expenditures of public funds (we spend nearly as much on our unpreparedness as Germany does on her magnificently efficient system), is in the improper coördination of promotion in the regular army. Time after time Congressional Committees have expressed a willingness to legislate for the national defense provided the officers of the regular army would agree as to what is needed. This agreement has never been reached. In the nature of the case it cannot be reached. There will not even be agreement upon this plan. Looking at the whole thing in a dispassionate way, a stranger from Mars would suspect that Congress had always acted toward the army on the principle "Divide and Rule," because officers are so placed by reason of the methods of promotion that they cannot advocate what they know to be correct without at the same time advocating something that is detrimental to their own interests. The personal interest, because the personal promotion of each one, is tied up in legislation which will specially increase his separate

branch. It is mighty easy to argue that which benefits my own branch benefits me, and what benefits me must necessarily benefit the country. It is a very easy and very natural mental attitude that your duty is to your own arm or branch of the service, only; that what promotes the interest of that arm, and incidentally promotes your own, must also be of general interest. This attitude does not imply mental dishonesty, but merely lack of perspective.

This accounts for the extreme efforts made in the past, and being made now, by officers identified with particular elements of the service to secure legislation for disproportionate increase of their own branches. As long as the condition exists the results will follow. Cavalry officers will work for cavalry increase, artillery officers for artillery increase, staff department officers for increase of their respective staff departments, and so on. Just that long citizens and congressmen will be able to point to the diverse views published by army officers, and to use this as an excuse for inaction.

The Remedy The remedy is simple. All officers render the same service, in a broad way, to the nation. All of them give up civil pursuits and devote their talents to the military service. Some work in one line of activity, some in another; but all give up civil life, and all devote their time to the army. Then let them share and share alike the hardships and the benefits of that

service, as far as Congressional action can make this possible. Rank and authority should depend upon capacity, duty and assignment; but there is no reason in the world why pay and quarters and allowances should depend upon accident. Rank and authority will come, in the end, when military opportunity is presented, to him who, like Grant, knows how to use them; but there should be no discrimination based upon legislative favor. Let the question of personal advantage be forever settled, in time of peace, by making rank depend upon length of commissioned service for all alike, leaving assignments to duty to be made by the War Department according to fitness and qualifications. Those who have profited by special promotion above their fellows in the past should be the last (though they will probably be the first) to obstruct the development of a satisfactory scheme of National Defense by holding up constructive plans until further advantage shall be given to them. They have already profited. Let them be content with what legislative favor they have already received. The solution is to place all officers on one list for promotion, according to length of commissioned service. Those who have already been promoted beyond where they would have been by this method should be simply held to their present grades until those now below them, but who would be above if this equitable plan had been always fol-

lowed, shall reach their proper places. They will not be deprived of any rank or pay by this readjustment, but they will not gain any further advantage over their fellows. They should not desire to do so; and if any so do desire, their desire should not be gratified.

*Effects of
This Reform*

With the introduction of this feature in promotion, there will be no longer any element of personal interest or any special interest inimical to the general interest in any part of the service. There will be some, of course, whose field of vision will be so narrow that they cannot take in anything that lies outside the scope of their own special duties. There are company commanders who place the advantage of their companies above the general interest of their regiments; quartermasters ready, through shortsightedness, to sacrifice the interest of the troops to that supposed by them to be the special interest of their departments; brigade commanders willing to sacrifice the interest of the whole command to look out for the special interest of their own brigade. In a much larger way, the interest of the Line of the army, the fighting element of it, which have never been permanently represented in Washington, have always been sacrificed in favor of those of the Permanent Staff Departments, which have always been strongly represented there. But all these special interests will cease to exist with

the adoption of the simple rule that an officer's rank and pay shall depend solely, in time of peace, upon his date of commission, that all officers shall share alike in promotion, though assignment to station and duty will depend upon fitness and attainments.

*Special
Promotion*

It is desirable to introduce a feature permitting special promotion for special services; but such feature can be introduced in a way that will do no injustice to any one, and will not break the general rule above indicated. Certain additional officers are always necessary for details of various kinds on detached service. College duty, militia duty, instructors in West Point and other service schools, and the necessary number of officers to form what would be known as "The Generals' Staff," must all be provided for in any system, in addition to the exact number required to complete the organizations laid down in the tables of organization. An allowance of ten per cent in each grade for these purposes will be adequate, which allowance should be made in the form of a "Distinguished Service List," to which promotions should be made from the next lower grade for appropriate services, valid in the advance grade until the same grade be reached by ordinary promotion, and then terminated by such promotion, to be filled by another detail of some other meritorious officer.

Such a provision as this would give every legitimate opportunity for special reward for special services, yet would not in any way interfere with nor invalidate the rule of strictly impartial promotion of all officers according to length of commissioned service. Also, it would limit rewards to reasonable amounts, would not cause any blocks in subsequent promotion by loading up the higher grades with young officers, and would offer every reasonable incentive to all officers to merit such recognition by suitable service.

The adoption of these provisions would terminate dissension among officers based upon self interest or corps interest, for with the adoption of these provisions there would be no divergence of interests among officers. Unity of views can never be reached, because of differences of education, of information, and of judgment. But with the elimination of self interest and unfair self seeking through dangerous special inflations of different arms or elements, much less divergence of views would be found.

*Supply of
Commissioned
Officers*

The educated men to complete the organization of the Minute Men are already available in our country; men educated in the technical military sense. The education of a commissioned officer is never complete. It never ends. But the preliminary education necessary to start in the per-

formance of the duties of the lower grades, up to include those of a company commander, has been given annually to about 10,000 young men in the United States through the direct activity of the United States Government, for the last fifty years. The moment we get away from the volunteer idea of raising men, which is based on the personal popularity of the officer, the minute we enforce the duty of military service as a duty, the same as payment of taxes, we can avail ourselves of this supply of material for commissioned officers and begin to train them, as well as their men, in their duties. There are not less than a hundred thousand well trained graduates of military schools suitable for the duties of lieutenant and captain, and of suitable military age, in this country. These men are graduates of such military schools as V. M. I., Culver, St. Johns, Kemper, and a hundred others; schools second only to West Point. The service postgraduate schools are available for the further training of such of these men as may be commissioned "Officers of Minute Men." Their practical duty in the Training School for Minute Men with the very same organizations and very same men with whom they are to be associated in time of war will complete their training and make of them the best lot of officers in the whole world. Each of them will know in person every man of his organization. These men do not enter the militia, as a rule. After having been graduated

from a good military school they do not care to enter as privates, and since at their age they cannot have wardheeler influence in politics they are wholly deficient in the sort of popularity that would cause them to be elected to office in the militia. But they are the best material in the country for company officers of federal volunteers or of Minute Men, and the number already trained is far in excess of the necessities of the situation, while the military schools, a hundred of them, some a little better than others but all good, are turning them out at the rate of 10,000 per year.

Expansion The system of expansion to be pro-
for War posed, by which the national forces
will be mobilized, must be sufficiently
indicated here to show just how these officers will
fit into it.

Each regiment of the Training School will furnish a brigade of the war force, and every man of it a trained man, accustomed to touch elbows in ranks with the man on his right and left. In addition, each regiment of the Training School will also have enough trained personnel, after the third year, to leave an organized, working force at the training school at work training recruits for this brigade to be ready to take the places of those who will drop out as soon as war begins.

The Division will become an army of three divisions of infantry, with corresponding amounts of

all the auxiliary arms in due proportion. Each brigade will become a division of three brigades in this war organization. Each regiment will furnish the entire personnel of a brigade of three regiments, all trained, on furlough, equipped, accustomed at the annual maneuver camp to working together, ready for instant action. Each battalion will become a regiment.

The division commander will become the army commander; each brigade commander will become a division commander; each regimental commander will become a brigade commander. The new regiments will receive commanders from the Field Officers of the parent regiment, and each will be furnished a trained staff from the subaltern officers of the training school. Thus every administrative position, every place of command in this whole army, will be filled by not merely a capable, trained officer, but by the very best possible one, the very man who trained this group of men, the man known as an instructor by every one of them.

Now all that is necessary to make this the best officered force in the world is equally capable company officers, and these will all be taken from the ranks of the Training School itself, out of the trained college graduates of military colleges who will have already a four years' course next in value to that at West Point before they volunteer for the Minute Men service. It would be impossible to

devise a more perfect system of selecting the necessary commissioned officers for our war force. It is actually better than it would be to have all of them West Pointers, for these officers of Minute Men will not have to break down any popular prejudice, nor to overcome any tendency to "snobbishness." Trained, capable, and suitable, that very training will justify their selection for the duties of officers to their comrades and instructors; yet they are of the common people, and able to look at things from the same point of view as their men. No better system of selecting and appointing officers could be possibly devised. No other, ever proposed, offers any such system; and this advantage, alone, should be decisive as to its adoption.

Each officer of Minute Men should receive his commission as an officer in time of peace and enter upon his duties at the annual maneuver camps at the end of the training school year, when all the Minute Men would be annually called out for review of their past work and refitting of their equipment. Thus every officer, from the Commanding General down to the last lance corporal, would gain actual experience with his own organization, and enter upon the war service, when called, perfectly prepared, fully acquainted with all the personnel of that organization. After war begins his promotion will be according to his services. Any man among these Minute Men may be a Von Moltke, a Grant, or a McKinley.

CHAPTER XII.

THE TRANSITION PERIOD.

*Analogy
Continued*

This discussion would be incomplete without one more lesson drawn from the analogy of the Banker, the Contractor, and the Supervising Architect. The first care of an honest Contractor would be to put a competent, technically competent, Supervising Architect on the job, and the first care of the Banker would be to see that there was a competent, technically competent, Supervising Architect on the job. If there was any doubt in the mind of the Banker on that point he would at once put a man of his own selection on that job. A million dollar contract for a fine mansion would be too important a thing to trust to an amiable clergyman, or an upright judge, or a reputable doctor, or even to an honest lawyer (if there is one—I am a lawyer myself). He would insist that this work be done under the constant supervision of a technically capable man. In our analogy the Secretary of War may stand in the same relation to the National Defense that Supervising Architect would stand to the construction of the Banker's mansion.

*A
Disclaimer*

This is not written to criticise any individual; far from it. Still less is it intended to reflect upon the motives, integrity, or good faith of any individual. Our

people are only too prone to make scape goats of the most convenient public official when things do not go right, and often without proper assessment of responsibility for failures. We can all remember the storm of criticism that burst upon Secretary Alger when sickness developed among the hastily assembled, untaught, and imperfectly organized volunteers of 1898. A Secretary of War once had to make his escape from Washington and from office without even the formality of public announcement, after the "Battle of Bladensburg." Possibly the latter Secretary had tried to do something that was beyond his military capacity, and the President's injunction to "leave the management of military operations to the military commanders" may have been amply justified by the facts; but both these Secretaries suffered from the evil effects of a system of which they were at least as much the victims as the beneficiaries. The system should be improved so that none but technically competent men can be called to that office; and the individual should be judged in the light of the system of which he was a part.

*A Technically
Capable
Secretary* We have had able politicians on that job. There have been eminent college professors in that office, and it has been at least once graced by a jurist who developed into Presidential timber. But who can name one of them who was *technically*

capable of performing the duties of a Supervising Architect in the construction of the Edifice of National Defense? A Secretary with a mania for exercising personal military command fled from the battlefield of Bladensburg by the light of the burning Capitol which was captured by the British as a result of his incompetence. Another forced on the country an inefficient system of military organization that prolonged the Civil War three years at least; or rather this was done by a Secretary of the Treasury, acting for a Secretary of War who was not performing the duties of a Supervising Architect but was allowing them to be performed by one of his colleagues in the Cabinet; his successor, mentioned in our school histories as "The Great War Secretary," blundered along, interfering time after time with military operations which would probably have been successful without his interference, until the tremendous personality of a Grant took the military command out of his hands and brought the war to an end; another permitted the adoption of a false system for the "General Staff," whereby its usefulness as a military body is at least greatly impaired.

If the administration of the Supervising Architect on the construction of the Banker's mansion were of this character, neither the Banker's money, nor the Architect's plans, nor the Contractor's honesty and experience would avail to build the

desired mansion. His money would be uselessly frittered away, and the completed edifice would not correspond in any way to the plan that the Banker had in mind.

*Look at the
Results in
the case of
National
Defense*

So it has been with the preparation of the National Defense. Congress has been exceedingly liberal in the appropriation of money for that purpose; but there is no National Defense in existence; none worthy of the name, and no plan in sight prepared by any of these superintendents. Under the management of Secretaries of War ignorant of *the technical work* of the job the country has twice gone bankrupt (1779-1863), has squandered annually as much money to get results as the German Empire has spent for its magnificent preparedness, and has nothing whatever to show for it. What we have for the national defense is virtually nothing; it would not be a drop in the bucket of a modern war; and the false system that incapacity has fastened upon the country would lead first to humiliation, then to bankruptcy, and at last to ruin. What we have as a result of political management of our national military resources for over a hundred years is absolutely worse than nothing at all.

*The First
Necessity*

Therefore, without criticism of any individual in word or thought, the first step in the application of this plan, the only plan that will work, should be the appoint-

ment of a *technically* capable Secretary of War to supervise its execution.

The plans above suggested are radical; but they are correct. These plans will be eventually adopted; perhaps not in the day of the author, perhaps not in time to prevent a great national disaster, but will be adopted in the end because they are the only possible way in which adequate preparation can be made in time of peace for the National Defense. When they are adopted the first step in their development will be the appointment of a *technically* capable Secretary of War, of such a tremendous personality that he can command the loyalty of those under him because they know his technical ability, know his integrity, know him to be as ruthless as he is fearless, and know that the man who opposes him treacherously will be discovered and remorselessly broken on the wheel.

*Installation
of the system*

The installation of this system after the enactment of the necessary legislation, will be a big job, and will require considerable time, even in the hands of such a Secretary as above indicated. Some of the details of the transition can be foreseen; others would have to be worked out as the occasions arise.

*The D. S. O.,
"The Generals'
Staff"*

The Distinguished Service Order will at once take the place of the present "General Staff," and will place at the disposal of commanding officers an adequate body of officers selected on

account of distinguished services and thereby marked as exceptional men. The assignment of these officers to duty is left open in the plan, in order that such assignments may be unrestricted. The creation of the Distinguished Service Order gives a legitimate opportunity to reward exceptional merit, and since the determination of such cases is not provided for by statute it is necessarily open to regulation by the President. A peanut politician will be able to abuse this power; but the abuse cannot be permanent, nor extend beyond temporary promotion of a single grade; a wise administration can make of this opening a powerful incentive to greater energy, initiative and efficiency, in all officers, by basing such selections solely upon known merit.

*First Step in
Organization*

The first task will naturally be the organization of the new training school permanent personnel, and the assignment of the various organizations of the regular service to their proper places as components of the new forces. This will include the organization of the oversea defense on a permanent basis, the organization of the expeditionary force, the assignment of the permanent personnel to the sea coast defenses, and assignments to the four divisions of the national training school for Minute Men. It will involve reduction of strength in some organizations, increases in others, and transfers of

selected men to the places where their services will be the most useful; a general adjustment of round peg to round holes and square pegs to square holes.

Promotions As soon as the assignments of regi-
and ments to their duties can be deter-

Assignments mined the resulting promotions and assignments of commissioned officers will be made. This will be the much desired opportunity to readjust the whole matter of promotion among officers; for the number of promotions incident to these changes will be so great that even those officers who have benefitted greatly by legislative eccentricities or executive favoritism in the past will not lose anything by the change. Probably not a single officer will be compelled to "mark time" in grade on account of the readjustment upon an equitable basis of promotion. The troops assigned to oversea and expeditionary duty will proceed to their proper stations at such times thereafter as may be convenient, and their adjustment to their new duties will at once become a routine matter to be handled by their commanders. The troops assigned to duty as part of the training school personnel will be sent to stations at the most convenient places in their respective divisions, utilizing the great posts already in existence as far as practicable for training school stations. The officers and men to form these cadres will be selected with care, for such original work as this requires the highest available

order of talent; but once assigned, the further development of the training school work will take place normally under the commanders assigned to the four divisions and to the coast defense districts.

Expeditionary Force The Expeditionary Force should by all means be held intact as a unit

at some place where the climatic conditions permit year-round training, and where transportation facilities permit rapid movement of a division in any direction. For example the climatic conditions and the terrain about Atascadero, California, would be ideal for a compact cantonment of such a division. The transportation facilities are good at that point, but the geographic location might be considered too far west, though it is nearer the actual geographic center of our territorial possessions than any other satisfactory point. Texas affords places where such a division could operate all the year round as a whole, and there are many other suitable locations in other parts of the country. It might be thought advisable to distribute this force in three or four brigade cantonments, or even to station parts of it in or near large cities. In such cases no doubt the European system of quartering troops in compact barracks, instead of in the big parks which we miscall "Forts" or "Posts," would be preferable. These military reservations have a far greater value in connection with the training school system and for mobilization

points than for the use of expeditionary forces. But whatever might be the disposition of this force as to locality, the very last thing that should govern it would be the benefit of some group of land speculators or of the grocery and dry goods merchants of a locality which might be represented by an influential Congressman. A wise location of it would certainly not place it on a sandspit which is flooded by a tidal wave every time a high wind happens to coincide with a neap tide. Such a division would be kept in compact form, with the smallest possible accumulation of impedimenta that could retard its promptness or initiative of action.

Philippine The oversea defense would require
Defense immediate attention. Especially the
whole policy in the Philippine Islands
would be overhauled. The division assigned to that
duty would be removed from the unhealthy low-
lands and rice paddies near Manila. It would be
located in a healthy place in the uplands, where the
white man can bear his burden without contracting
seven different kinds of skin disease every time he
hits a golf ball far enough to make the caddy hunt
for it. The policy of trying to "conciliate" the
Tagalog would be abandoned and that race would
have a chance to get its feet out of the public
trough long enough to realize just how small and
insignificant it really is in the big sum total of
Philippine Islands.

*Philippine Defense
Not a Burden
but an Asset*

Instead of making the defense of the Philippines a burden to the United States it can be made, and should be made, a source of strength and a powerful base of operations in the Orient. To do this would be the simplest thing in the world; so simple that a mere outline will be convincing.

First of all, our country should be true and loyal to its own friends. It has plenty of them in the Philippines; natives who aided us in suppressing the Tagalog insurrection of 1899-1900, and who find in United States sovereignty their only protection. Among these known and tested friends may be mentioned the Macabebes, the Ifugaos, the Ilongots and the Igorrotes; all mountain tribes, hardy people, good material for soldiers, and all opposed to Tagalog supremacy as a matter of self-preservation. They know by bitter experience that they have nothing to expect that is good from Tagalog domination, and nothing bad to expect from American rule.

*Native
Auxiliaries*

In the northern mountains there are not less than 200,000 fighting men of these tribes only waiting to be organized into the finest force of native auxiliaries in the world. Their loyalty to the United States has already been proved by the touchstone of domestic war. Their hatred of the Tagalog is based not only

on racial animosity, but also on the unspeakable outrages committed by that tribe during the period of guerrilla warfare after the fall of Malolos in 1899 and before the final establishment of actual American authority in 1902 in their country. Here, in a temperate climate, where the white man thrives, and where his food products can be made prolific by a demand for them, should be stationed the division that will constitute the mobile defense of the Philippine Islands. It would be within easy reach of Manila at any time, on the flank of any enemy who might come from the north, in the face of one that might come from the south, and in exactly the right position to protect the land side of Corregidor, the only vulnerable point in the sea coast defense of Manila. Here it should organize these friendly tribes into a huge army of fighting men, trained for guerrilla warfare as native auxiliaries. Their native customs and ways of living should not be obliterated, but their fighting men should be enrolled, armed and trained, with military pay and allowances, especially in the way of food supplies, that would make their life more comfortable. They should be taught how to cultivate their fertile hills and valleys to produce the food and forage required for the American division, which would thus be rendered independent of the homeland in its food and forage supplies. Today we are still shipping oats and baled hay for the horses of the cavalry in

the Philippines, beans and bacon to the soldiers. These supplies would be cut off at the first alarm of war; but if the mountain country were mobilized as above indicated for defense the American division would be made independent of the homeland in these supplies, and the mountain inhabitants made comparatively wealthy by the increase that would result in their industrial activities.

Results In a year this policy could be made to develop a native auxiliary force of a hundred thousand fighting men who hate the Tagalog and dread nothing so much as Tagalog supremacy, who have the fatalistic courage of the oriental, and who would fight loyally by the side of the American Soldiers against any enemy, as they have done in the past. In three years there could be organized over 200,000 of these native troops, with an impregnable base in a healthy climate, producing everything necessary for the indefinite maintenance of all the forces engaged, yet not capable of independent action that could embroil us with any other country. To successfully attack Manila from the North would be impossible for any country with such a force as this in the mountain fastnesses on its flank. An attack from the South would have distinct advantages for the defenders. A direct attack from the sea upon Manila could not be made as long as Corregidor stands, and Corregidor could not fall as long as the heights at Mariveles were com-

manded by the strategic position of this force. This policy would expose the Tagalog to all the risks and hardships of war, if they should again solicit the help of a foreign foe, to help them drive out or kill all the white people. Possibly such a policy as this might even open the eyes of this tribe, to the difference between American rule and what it might expect under Japanese or German dominion. It would expose an enemy to the enervating influence of a climate inimical to people from the temperate zone, while our own forces would have a healthy base in the temperate mountains from which they could draw practically inexhaustible supplies and levies of trained auxiliaries. The general policy of trained Minute Men could be adapted to this situation, and the American division would become the training school of this element. If, in the course of time, it might be possible to develop a body of natives capable of defending their country, this would be the very best evidence of their capacity for self government, and the United States might then withdraw from it honorably, leaving it in their hands, if any constitutional method can be found for such withdrawal.

*Why not done
long ago?*

The only reason why such a policy as this has not been instituted long ago in the Philippines, is that we have never had a policy on that subject. Our country drifted into this problem by accident. It has

drifted along from year to year. Nothing has been done on the theory of permanency, because there has always been a pernicious agitation for a new doctrine of secession. The possibility of secession by Act of Congress, upon the demand of a single tribe of discontented and incapable agitators, is as gravely discussed today, as that of secession by Act of a State Legislature was discussed in 1860, and with consequences as evil.

Change of Policy This policy would have to be changed radically; reversed. Our friendship, our favors, our loyal support, are due to these tribes collectively, and to those persons individually, who have shown loyalty and friendship to us. We should arm and equip them, place them in positions of honor and trust, seize the strategic points of value for health and defense, and make the Philippine Islands an asset in case of Oriental disturbances, instead of an element of national weakness from every point of view. The policy thus outlined, civil and military, would speedily have that result. It would make the Philippine Islands unassailable and would place in the hands of the United States a powerful army of native troops, absolutely loyal, first-class fighting men, ready to throw a heavy sword into the scales of diplomacy whenever our interests might call for such a make-weight. Such a system would remove the Japanese

bogy from the field of American politics, and would insure either the permanence of Chinese sovereignty or a due consideration of American interests in the division of spoils whenever that may come.

The system of Minute Men development herein proposed would no doubt be modified more or less to suit the conditions of the Philippines; but the elasticity of the system would provide ample latitude for such modifications, and its application would make of the Philippine Division, like the other divisions of the training school, a productive agency, actively engaged in training the necessary personnel for defense of its territory. It would employ these Filipinos who are worthy of trust in the defense of their own country; and if, at some future time, it should please Providence to make them completely capable and responsible for their own defense there would be an adequate force, properly trained, with which to meet that responsibility for a time. It is not at all necessary that the Philippine Islands should be a "White Elephant"; but if they are to be redeemed, there must be at least a small degree of human intelligence used in their management, a small degree of loyalty shown to our friends, a little reasonable foresight employed.

Other Auxiliaries The permanent personnel assigned to Hawaii, Panama, Alaska, Porto Rico, would find considerable opportunity to develop similar auxiliaries in their respec-

tive divisions, and would utilize the local material and personnel as far as possible. The resources available in these localities would be much smaller than in the Philippines, but their proximity to the United States would make it probably possible to reinforce them after war becomes imminent. The geographical location of the Philippines would make such reinforcement impossible until after the mastery of the Pacific Ocean should be determined by naval operations. Hence the development of local Minute Men in the other oversea possessions is not as important as it is in the Philippine Islands.

Gradual Installation The training school features of this plan present the great advantage that it need not necessarily be installed as a whole, at one time. A single regiment, even, could be sent as a training school nucleus to each division, and the system could be started on a reduced scale, to be expanded as Congress may see fit to authorize the personnel. It could be thus expanded from time to time without in any way affecting the underlying principles of the system until the complete scheme would be in operation; and if at some future time it should be found that a larger war insurance is necessary the system herein outlined would be capable of indefinite expansion to meet such necessity.

***No Increase of
Appropriations***

In the original installation of this system, on account of lack of trained officers in our country, it would be advisable to proceed by successive steps. First should be organized the fighting First Line Divisions of the permanent personnel and the one relief of the permanent personnel of the coast defense. One brigade could be assigned to each of the four divisions of the training school without any increase of the personnel of the regular army, except possibly, a few more commissioned officers. The next year could see the organization of a second brigade of the training school, the third brigade being organized in the third year. This gradual application of the system would make it possible to supply trained officers for the permanent personnel. The gradual development of the Minute Man component would give time to develop a system for selecting and training the commissioned officers of that component. No tremendous increase of untrained personnel in any grade would be necessary. No big increase of appropriations, in fact no increase at all, would be necessary. It would only be necessary to maintain the pension appropriations at their present schedule, and to make the surplus unexpended in that way from year to year, available for the use of the President in the gradual expansion of this system to its complete basis. This would insure its application in a progressive manner as

fast as the trained officers could be supplied; and in ten years from now the United States would be the best prepared, strongest nation in the world for self defense.

Every unit of our forces would be homogeneous. All its members would be equally well taught, all trained in the same system, for the same length of time. All will look upon any military problem in the same way, can count upon one another to do the expected thing, to show team play.

There would be no delay for the fabrication and issue of equipment, or requisitioning of military supplies. The only immediate problem in mobilization will be that of the grocer; and whether we feed a few thousand of our great population in one place or another is a small matter in our country, with its great transportation facilities. The arms, equipment and clothing, of every Minute Man will be already issued, ready at his rendezvous for instant use. The whole concern would break into action with all the snap and vim of a well trained fire department.

CHAPTER XIII.

LEGISLATION.

An act of Congress embodying the correct principles will be necessary to put a sound scheme of National Defense (or any other scheme) into operation. It might take the following form:

Be it enacted, etc.

I. Enrollment All able-bodied male citizens of the United States, and all foreign born persons who have declared their intention to become citizens, between the ages of 18 and 45 years of age, shall be enrolled as liable to military service for the National Defense.

How Enrolled It shall be the duty of every citizen liable under the foregoing article to render a personal report on such form as may be prescribed by the President on the first of January each year, and failure to render such report shall be a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not less than five hundred nor more than five thousand dollars. Jurisdiction over this offense is hereby expressly conferred upon any general court-martial before which may be arraigned any person duly charged with this offense, according to the regular methods of military procedure. In case of failure or inability to pay said fine the reviewing authority is empowered to commute said fine into military service, one year for each one hundred dollars of the

fine, in addition to any other military service due from the delinquent and not subject to any exemption, to be counted as drafted service.

Records For the purpose of this enrollment, the whole territory of the United States shall be divided into divisions, as hereinafter prescribed, and the reports shall be kept in the form of a card indexed card record, to be kept in such form as may be prescribed by the President, as part of the military records of the United States. For the purpose of keeping these records the services of men who are physically disqualified for other forms of duty will be utilized as far as practicable.

II. Exemptions The following classes of persons will be exempt from draft under the provisions of this act, under such regulations as may be prescribed by the President, but shall pay in lieu of military service the sum of one hundred dollars per year, which payments shall be covered into the Treasury of the United States and credited to the funds for the support of the National Defense; the head or only support of a family; teachers in military schools, approved by the President, members of municipal police and fire departments duly certified as such by the proper authorities; regularly enrolled members of the organized militia; provided that no payment shall be required from any member of the regularly enrolled militia.

III. Classification The whole body of enrolled citizens liable to military duty shall be divided into three classes, as follows (after deducting the Permanent Personnel of National Defense) :

Class A, Minute Men, available for immediate service, under obligation for a term of four years.

Class B, Honor Men, composed of Minute Men who have completed their period of obligation for immediate service, but are still of military age and who have volunteered for additional service as "Volunteers" in case of attack upon the United States. These men shall be authorized to wear a suitable decoration to be known as "The Badge of Honor," to be furnished by the United States.

Class C, all other citizens of military age not exempt from military service under the provisions of this Act.

IV. Permanent Personnel The Permanent Personnel shall be the regular army of the United States, which shall receive the pay and allowances now prescribed by law and shall be organized under such regulations as may be prescribed by the President, as follows:

Two Divisions for Oversea Defense; one Expeditionary Division; one Relief for the permanent Coast Defense Fortifications that have been or may

be hereafter authorized by Congress; and four divisions on a training school basis as hereinafter prescribed; provided that in this Act a Division shall be taken to consist of the smallest body comprising all components of the service in due proportion, complete in itself for independent service, as provided in the Field Service Regulations of 1914, and subject to such modifications from time to time as shall be warranted by the progress of the military art, and authorized by the President in Field Service Regulations. It is the appropriate command for a Major General in our service.

Permanent personnel shall be assigned to the training school divisions at the rate of a full complement of commissioned officers and 25 selected enlisted men per company, and this Permanent Personnel shall be the trainers and instructors of the transient personnel; provided that in the coast defenses Permanent Personnel shall consist of one complete relief for the permanent fortifications authorized by law, and Transient Personnel shall consist of two reliefs, to be under instruction by the Permanent Personnel in like manner as other members of the transient personnel.

V. Transient Personnel The Transient Personnel shall be divided into two parts:

1. The members of the Training School under instruction. The number authorized for this pur-

pose, shall be at the rate of 125 men for each company of the training school; this being the number necessary to give to each company the full quota authorized in the training school, 150 enlisted men per company, 25 old soldiers and 125 recruits under training to become Minute Men upon completion of their year of training.

The Transient Personnel of the training schools shall be known as Students of the National Training School, and shall be entitled to wear a suitable badge to be furnished by the government while on that status.

Students of the National Training School shall receive free instruction in all its courses of instruction which shall comprise the military duties of a citizen and such vocational training as may be found practicable in addition thereto; shall be furnished with uniforms and food and medical attendance free of expense; shall be furnished quarters suitable for their duties free of expense; and shall receive a bounty of \$100 upon honorable completion of the course of training; provided that all Students of the National Training School shall agree upon entrance therein to perform the duties of "Minute Men in the National Defense" for a period of three years after the completion of their course of instruction, which agreement shall be in writing and shall be held as a valid contract subjecting the maker of it to military service of the United States as a Minute

Man in accordance with the Rules and Articles of War.

2. Minute Men; which class shall comprise all those who shall have completed the course of instruction in the Training School, and who shall be held to liability for military service as Minute Men for a period of three years as provided in their contracts upon entrance into the training school.

Provided; that the total number of Students of the National Training School shall not exceed the number prescribed in the Field Service Regulations that shall be prescribed by the President, nor shall the annual appropriations for the support of the National Defense be exceeded by reason of any change in said Field Service Regulations, but all pay and allowances shall cease upon exhaustion of said appropriations until further appropriations shall be made by Congress.

VI. Training The course of instruction in the training school shall be arranged under such regulations as may be prescribed by the President, and shall cover one year of time, divided into the following periods:

1. Enrollment and Organization.
2. Theoretical Instruction.
3. Practical Instruction.
4. Reduction to Cadre basis.
5. Vacation of not to exceed one month.

These periods of instruction shall be arranged in accordance with such Regulations for the National Training School as may be prescribed by the President; and during the third period the Minute Men may be recalled for a period of 14 days for additional instruction, completion of organization, and refitment of equipments.

Each graduate of the National Training School shall be furnished with a Diploma, setting forth his qualifications as a Graduate of the National Training School, and a suitable badge indicating his status as a Minute Man, which he will be authorized to wear at all times as a badge of honor.

Selection of Students, From the 1st of July to
Voluntary Applications to the 31st of July each
year the record offices of
each division of the National Training School shall receive voluntary applications from suitable persons for enrollment as Students of the National Training School. Each applicant will cause to be filled out in the proper place on his card the certificate of a medical officer that the applicant is physically suitable to perform the duties of a soldier, and a certificate by two reputable citizens that the applicant is a person of good moral character, a citizen of the United States or has declared his intention to become a citizen, and is recommended by them as suitable to receive the benefits of the Training School.

The period for voluntary applications shall close on the 31st of July, and as soon as may be thereafter the necessary number of Students shall be selected by lot from those who are eligible and who have applied according to law.

Drafted Students In case the total number of applicants found eligible shall not be sufficient to complete the number of students required for the annual class (147,000) the necessary number to complete the annual class shall be selected by lot from those citizens enrolled under the provisions of Article I of this Act, as liable to military duty, under such regulations as the President may from time to time prescribe, and the men so selected shall be notified to report for duty as Students of the National Training School at the opening of its next regular annual session, at the place that may be designated by proper authority, under the penalties provided in Article I of this Act for non-compliance.

Students drafted for service under these provisions shall not receive any bounty, pension or promotion, but shall be held to the personal performance of the duties of Students of the National Training School and of Minute Men in like manner as other students and Minute Men, and jurisdiction is hereby expressly conferred upon any general court-martial before which any person may be properly arraigned

charged with violation of said duties according to the regular methods of military procedure.

Status of Minute Men At the close of the period of practical instruction in the National Training School the Students who have honorably completed its course of instruction shall be given their Diplomas, and furloughed for a period of three years as Minute Men. Each Minute Man shall be issued a card on which his rank, organization, duty, rendezvous in case of call to active service, and status as a volunteer or drafted Minute Man shall be indicated. A duplicate card shall be retained with the records of the Training School, which shall also contain the address of the man. It shall be the duty of the Minute Man to promptly notify the proper officers of the training school in case of a permanent change of his address, in order that his card may be transferred to the most convenient organization. The arms and equipment of each Minute Man shall be stored at the proper rendezvous and notation shall be made on his card by which his equipments can be located in the store-room.

VII. Mobilization A period of three years must elapse before the full results of the training school system will be attained. When this shall be accomplished, each regiment of the training school will be able to mobilize a complete brigade of Minute Men, in addition to maintaining

the complete operation of its branch of the Training School; the three classes of Minute Men furnishing the men for the brigade and the current class continuing its duty in the training school. In all mobilizations of the Minute Men the permanent officers of the training school shall be assigned to the higher duties of command and administration. The battalion commanders shall be assigned to the regiments into which their battalions will be expanded, the regimental commanders of the training school shall be assigned to command the brigades into which their regiments will be expanded, and the brigade commanders to command the divisions into which their respective brigades will be expanded. From the other permanent officers of the training school shall be assigned the staff and administrative officers of the expanded armies thus created.

Expansion At the end of the first year of the
First Year operation of the training school a
schedule of mobilization shall be prepared on a basis of expansion to twice the size of the training school, by calling to the active service the Minute Men in addition to the students of the Training School. This schedule of mobilization shall govern until the end of the second year of the operation of the Training School.

Officers shall be provided by first promoting the permanent officers of the training school, and then

by filling vacancies by promotion from the eligible classes for such appointment, in the following order:

1. From the Permanent Personnel, enlisted, if any are eligible.
2. From graduates of the Training School who are eligible.
3. From graduates of approved Military Colleges.
4. From Civil Life.

Commissions in the proper grades as Commissioned Officers of Minute Men for a period of one year shall be issued regularly to all these officers, from whatever source they may be appointed, and the officers thus appointed shall be regularly assigned to duty in the scheme of mobilization for that year.

Expansion At the end of the second year of
Second Year operation of the Training School a new schedule of mobilization shall be prepared, on a basis of expanding the training school to three times its normal size, by calling to active service two classes of Minute Men, in addition to the current class under instruction in the Training School, and vacancies in the various grades of commissioned officers shall be filled as before by appointments for one year.

*Expansion
Third Year*

At the end of the third year of operation of the training school a new schedule of mobilization shall be prepared on a basis of calling three classes of Minute Men to active service, and continuing the operation of the training school as a depot for recruiting and training of recruits.

In this schedule of mobilization, provision shall be made for a sufficient number of commissioned officers for the active force and also for the operation of the Training School, from the following sources:

1. The Commissioned Officers of the Permanent Personnel shall be promoted to fill all vacancies in the war force and training school, as far as this supply will go, filling all positions of command and administration in the higher grades.
2. Officers who have held one-year commissions as Commissioned Officers of Minute Men, and whose service has been satisfactory, form the next class of eligibles from which promotions will be made.
3. The other classes above enumerated as eligible will then be used in the order enumerated for the remainder of commissioned officers of Minute Men necessary. Regular commissions as Officers of Minute Men will

be issued for a period of one year, by the Secretary of War, under such regulations as may be prescribed by the President. In like manner commissioned officers will be provided for annually in annual schedules for mobilization.

Promotions in Time of War After the original assignments have been made pursuant to the foregoing provisions, promotions and assignments in time of war shall be made by the President under such regulations as he may prescribe.

VIII. Appointments and Promotions in Permanent Personnel To fill vacancies created by the operation of this Act in the Permanent Personnel, and all vacancies that shall occur in the Permanent Personnel after this Act shall take effect, separate lists of eligibles shall be established as hereinafter provided, and each list of eligibles shall be exhausted for the time being before any nomination shall be made from the next list of eligibles in order.

List No. 1 Commissioned Officers of the Permanent Personnel of the Army, in the order determined by their length of service as commissioned officers in the service of the United States. For the purposes of this Act, all service as commissioned officers shall be counted, whether in the army, the navy, the marine corps, in regulars or

in volunteers. Service as a commissioned officer of militia shall not be counted on this list, unless such service shall have been rendered in the service of the United States pursuant to a regular call by the President as prescribed by law for calling the militia into the service of the United States.

Upon the occurrence of a vacancy in any branch of the service the vacancy shall be tendered to the officer at the top of the next lower list, and if he shall decline such vacancy it shall pass to the officer next on that list, and so on until it shall be filled. The object of this provision is to enable officers of technical training in special arms to await the occurrence of a vacancy in that arm of the service in which they have been specially trained (e.g., Medical Corps).

If any commissioned officer, having been nominated for a vacancy in the branch of the service in which he has had technical training, shall decline such appointment, he shall retain his then rank and commission, but his name shall be stricken from all lists for promotion and the President shall be authorized to retire such officer whenever, in the judgment of the President, such retirement shall be to the best interests of the service. The Graduates of the United States Military Academy shall be placed each year at the bottom of the list for promotion in the order of their graduation standing.

List No. 2 Enlisted men of the Permanent Personnel who shall have passed a satisfactory examination under such regulations as the President may prescribe, as long as they remain eligible. To be eligible an enlisted man must be unmarried, must have at least four years service, and must have passed a satisfactory examination, and be of an age between 21 and 30 years.

List No. 3 Graduates of approved Military Colleges who have voluntarily applied for the enrollment in the Training School and have rendered approved service therein.

List No. 4 Applicants from civil life, unmarried, of good moral character, between 21 and 30 years of age, who shall have passed a satisfactory examination under such regulations as may be prescribed by the President.

IX. Period of Obligation Enlistments in the Permanent Personnel shall be for a period of five years, under such regulations as may be prescribed by the President.

Students in the Training School shall serve one year as Students, and shall then be under the military obligation of a Minute Man for a period of three years.

X. Annual Training The President shall have power to call all Minute Men into active service for practical training for a period of not to exceed one month each year.

Provided; that no contract for personal service between any Minute Man and any employer shall be abrogated or impaired on account of such practical training, and that every employer who discharges any Minute Man on account of such practical training shall be guilty of a Misdemeanor punishable by a fine of one year's pay of said Minute Man under the terms of his contract, which fine shall be payable to the Minute Man by said employer upon order and execution from any federal court in lieu of all damages to said Minute Man from loss of position or employment, costs of the process to be paid by the employer upon judgment and execution by the court.

XI. Other Forces of United States;
Class C

The citizens of the United States liable to military service not included in the Permanent Personnel, nor in the Training School as Students, nor in the Minute Men, nor in the Organized Militia, enrolled in Class C of this Act, shall not be called into the military service except when specially authorized by Congress; but when so called shall be organized as hereinafter provided.

Apportionment

The number authorized by Congress shall be apportioned to the divisions and districts in proportion to population, and the apportionment shall specify the number and classes of troops called for from each district.

Voluntary Enrollments A period shall be allotted during which voluntary enrollments shall be made in response to the call, and applicants for such enrollment examined to determine their fitness for the military service. All such applicants shall be entitled to the same bounty as Minute Men if accepted.

Compulsory Enrollment At the expiration of the period for voluntary enrollment a sufficient number of men shall be drawn by lot, under such regulations as may be prescribed by the President, to complete the number called for in the apportionment. But no man who is thus drafted shall be entitled to any bounty, pension, or promotion except that any soldier may be promoted for gallantry in action in time of war under such regulations as the President may prescribe.

Exemptions The same rules shall govern exemptions as provided in the annual drafts for Students in the Training School.

Substitutes In case any drafted man shall offer a substitute, inquiry shall be made in regard to the conditions. The substitute must be a man who was not himself drafted nor otherwise under obligation to serve at this time, must be acceptable in every way, and the man who seeks exemption must be a citizen engaged in some occupation useful to the nation as well as to himself. The exempt must pay to the substitute a bounty at the

same rate as that paid by the government to Minute Men, and shall in addition indemnify the substitute for loss of time and risk incurred. If all these conditions are complied with, substitutes may be accepted under such regulations as may be prescribed by the President.

Supply of Officers All commissioned officers of field rank shall be appointed by selection from the permanent personnel to temporary commissions, which appointments shall make temporary vacancies in the Permanent Personnel, to be filled with temporary appointments as provided for regular vacancies, such appointees being in all respects on the same basis as other officers of the Permanent Personnel, except that they hold temporary commissions to be vacated when the occasion for their services shall have passed.

All other commissioned officers shall be filled by selection from the following classes, in the order named:

1. From the Permanent Personnel, as far as consistent with the interest of the public service, to be determined by the President.
2. From the Minute Men, under the same conditions; "Honor Men" to be counted as Minute Men for this purpose.
3. From Civil Life, under such regulations as the President may prescribe for that purpose.

Promotions All promotions in the volunteer forces of the United States shall be made by selection, under such regulations as the President may prescribe.

XII. Pay and Allowances 1. The pay and allowances of the Permanent Personnel shall be as now prescribed by law.

2. The allowances of Students at the Training School and of Minute Men shall be the same as those of the permanent personnel while on active duty. In addition, the allowances of students at the training school and of Minute Men while on active service, shall include an amount equal to ten per cent of the pay of the permanent personnel as expense money. Drafted men are entitled to the ten per cent allowance for expense money and to all allowances while on active duty. Minute Men are not entitled to allowances of any kind while on a status of furlough.

3. Every man who is voluntarily enrolled as a Student at the Training School shall be entitled to a bounty of one hundred dollars at the end of his year of service at the training school, and to a further bounty of one hundred dollars at the end of each year of his service as a Minute Man.

This bounty shall not be subject to fines or forfeitures except for desertion from the service.

All volunteers for enrollment accepted upon a call by the President for additional troops from Class

C shall be entitled to the same bounty as Minute Men, and all men accepted for service whether by voluntary enrollment or by draft from Class C shall be entitled to the same allowances, including the ten per cent expense money, as Minute Men.

4. No drafted man shall receive bounty or pension in any form.

XIV. Pensions All men not drafted shall have the same status in regard to pensions as now provided by law.

XV. Rules and Regulations 1. The rules and Articles of War shall govern the Training School, Minute Men when called into active service, and additional forces of Class C when such forces are called into the service.

2. The President shall have power to prescribe all needful rules and regulations to carry into effect the provisions of this Act; provided that in no case shall the amount of money appropriated by Congress be exceeded.

XVI. When Effective The provisions of this Act shall take effect upon its signature by the President.

XVII. Appropriation For contingent expenses during the installation of the system herein provided for, to be expended in the discretion of the President for any purpose in his judgment necessary in this work and not other-

wise provided for by law, there is hereby appropriated and set aside the sum of fifty million dollars from any funds in the Treasury of the United States not otherwise appropriated, to be available at once, and to continue available until exhausted or until the installation of the system shall be complete and all its incidental expenses shall be otherwise provided for by law, and any remaining balance thereof shall thereupon revert to the Treasury of the United States when in the judgment of the President such appropriation is no longer necessary.

XVIII. Distinguished Service Order There shall be established in the Permanent Commissioned Personnel an order to be known as "The Distinguished Service Order," upon the installation of this system for the National Defense.

The number of officers in the distinguished service order shall be equal in each grade to ten per cent of the total number of officers provided for by the Field Service Regulations, and this number shall be in excess of the number provided for by the Field Service Regulations.

Commissions in the Distinguished Service Order shall be given in the name of the President, for distinguished service, to be determined by such means as the President may direct. Eligible lists for this

promotion shall be established once per year, and shall remain in force for one year. Promotions to the Distinguished Service Order shall be made from the next lower grade, and shall remain in force until the officer shall be promoted to the same grade by ordinary promotion, when his commission in the Distinguished Service Order shall cease and determine. The resulting vacancy shall be filled as in the case of other vacancies on this list.

The object of this provision is to place within the power of the President the opportunity to reward meritorious or specially distinguished service by a promotion of one grade, without thereby retarding the promotion or impairing the rights of other officers who may be equally meritorious, but may not have had equal opportunity to win such reward.

The Officers commissioned to the Distinguished Service Order shall constitute "The Generals' Staff" of the Army, and may be assigned to any duty consistent with their rank.

XIX. Territorial Divisions

For the purposes of this Act the territories of the United States shall be divided as follows:

1. Territorial Divisions, one for each tactical division of the mobile army, shall be established, and one tactical division of the army shall be assigned to each territorial division.

2. Each territorial division shall be subdivided into districts, one district for each brigade of infan-

try in the mobile army, and one brigade of infantry shall be assigned to that district.

The district may be subdivided into subdistricts, at the rate of one for each regiment of the brigade, in the discretion of the brigade commander, who shall be responsible for the administration of all military provisions of the law of the United States in his district.

3. For each permanent fortification of the sea coast of the United States there shall be set aside one coast defense district, which shall not be included in any division, but shall be administered by the proper officers of the sea coast defense Permanent Personnel.


*XX. Inventions
and Improvements*

The President shall have power to consider and test any new idea or invention, whether of equipment, ordnance, tactics, or of organization, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe from time to time, and to that end he shall have power to establish a Bureau to be known as "The Bureau of Inventions and Improvements," and to detail for duty therein such officers of the Distinguished Service Order as may be necessary. Provided; that if as a result of such test any idea, device, suggestion or equipment, be found to have a military value, the President shall have power to cause the same to be reserved for the exclusive use

of the United States, and to determine in what manner and by what amount the author or inventor of such idea, device, suggestion or equipment, shall be rewarded by the United States.

XXI. The military service herein provided for shall take the place of the military establishment heretofore prescribed by law; and all Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.

XXII. For the purpose of providing for the National Defense an adequate body of trained troops, until the foregoing provisions shall have resulted in an adequate body of Minute Men, the President is authorized to enroll as Minute Men, at once, any veteran of the War with Spain, or of the Philippine Insurrection, and any honorably discharged soldier of the United States, who shall apply for such enrollment and who shall pass a satisfactory physical examination, for a period of two years; and such veterans shall be entitled to all the rights, privileges, bounties, promotions, pensions, and other emoluments and rewards, as are herein prescribed for Minute Men who shall be hereafter graduated from the National Training School for Minute Men.



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